Self and Society
Who or What Can Have Rights?
The Case of Animals
Who or What Can Have Rights?
Raised this question when considering case of
abortion. Does a fetus have rights?
Issues discussed then will apply also to the debate
about whether animals have rights.
How we answer this question will affect our views
on controversial moral questions:
• Should we rear and kill animals for food?
• Should animals be used for laboratory
experiments?
• Should fox-hunting be banned?
Do animals have rights?
Bernard Rollin, Animal Rights and Human
Morality
Defends view that animals have rights such
as a right to life. Their right to life is not an
absolute right, but can be overridden only
by very strong moral reasons.
Rollin’s argument for animal rights
“There are no defensible grounds for excluding animals
from moral concern…if we grant…that people are
legitimate objects of moral concern… There is no
difference between people and animals that is relevant
to excluding animals from moral discussion… Entrance
into the moral arena is determined by something’s being
alive and having interests in virtue of that life…To put our
conclusion in the language of ‘rights’, we have
established that animals have a very basic right…, the
right to be dealt with as moral objects by any person who
has moral principles.”
Rollin’s argument for animal rights
If (1) humans have moral rights such as a right to life,
and (2) there is no morally relevant difference between
humans and animals,
then (3) animals have moral rights such as a right to life.
An ‘extensionist’ argument.
A valid argument. (3) follows logically from conjunction of
(1) and (2). So if want to reject (3), have to deny either
(1) or (2) or both.
Can we deny (2)? What would be a plausible candidate for
a ‘morally relevant difference’?
Is there a morally relevant difference
between humans and animals?
Possible candidates:
• Consciousness?
• Self-consciousness?
• Reason?
• Language?
Problem:
either the relevant feature is not possessed by all
humans,
or, if it is possessed by all humans, it is possessed
by at least some animals as well.
Is there a morally relevant difference
between humans and animals?
What features might be relevant to having rights?
Recall contrast between
• interests view of rights
• agency view of rights.
Rollin subscribes to ‘interests’ view.
But ‘agency’ view might be more plausible in
explaining distinctive character of rights. Beings
possess rights in virtue of being a certain kind of
agent – capable of a certain kind of activity.
Why might animals not have rights?
Some ‘agency’ views of rights
1. Animals are not capable of having the desires
which correspond to the relevant rights.
(Recall Tooley on abortion and infanticide – but
he thinks animals may well have some rights)
2. Animals are not capable of making claims on
us or on one another.
3. Animals are not capable of taking part in a
contract to establish moral rules. (Carruthers)
Peter Carruthers,
The Animals Issue
Extends Rawls’s contract theory of justice to a
general theory of morality and rights:
“According to Rawls, we are to think of morality as the set of rules that
would be agreed upon by rational agents choosing from behind a
veil of ignorance… Morality is here pictured as a system of rules to
govern the interaction of rational agents within society. It therefore
seems inevitable, on the face of it, that only rational agents will be
assigned direct rights on this approach. Since it is rational agents
who are to choose the system of rules, and choose self-interestedly,
it is only rational agents who will have their position protected under
the rules. There seems no reason why rights should be assigned to
non-rational agents. Animals will, therefore, have no moral standing
under Rawlsian contractualism, in so far as they do not count as
rational agents.”
A contract theory of
morality and rights
Problem: it also seems to entail that some humans
(new-born babies, the senile, the mentally
disabled) do not have rights.
Look at how Carruthers tries to deal with this.
A possible response: Distinguish having rights and
having moral status. (Neither Rollin nor
Carruthers makes a clear distinction between
the two.)
Having moral status = being an appropriate object
of moral concern.
Do animals have moral status?
How could animals have moral status
without having rights?
A possible answer:
• Rights for (normal adult) humans
• Utilitarianism for animals (and some
humans?)
The utilitarian argument for why
animals have moral status
Bentham: what is it that makes a being an
appropriate object of moral concern?
“Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of
discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a
more conversable animal, than an infant of a
day, or a week, or even a month, old. But
suppose they were otherwise, what would it
avail? The question is not, Can they reason?
nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
The utilitarian argument for why
animals have moral status
Peter Singer: “The capacity for suffering and
enjoying things is a pre-requisite for having
interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied
before we can speak of interests in any
meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say
that it was not in the interests of a stone to be
kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone
does not have interests because it cannot suffer.
Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make
any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the
other hand, does have an interest in not being
tormented, because it will suffer if it is.”
The utilitarian argument for why
animals have moral status
Singer: “If a being suffers, there can be no
moral justification for refusing to take that
suffering into consideration… This is why
the limit of sentience (using the term as a
convenient, if not strictly accurate,
shorthand for the capacity to suffer or
experience enjoyment or happiness) is the
only defensible boundary of concern for
the interests of others.”
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
Bentham and Singer are both utilitarians.
But could we combine a rights theory and a
utilitarian theory?
• Rights for (normal adult) humans
• Utilitarianism for animals (and some
humans)
Why might this be a plausible position?
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
What makes it morally wrong to end someone’s
life?
Recall discussion of euthanasia:
Respect for life is closely linked with respect for
autonomy. Respect for their choices about what
to do with their life. To end someone’s life is to
cut short their hopes and aspirations and plans
for their future.
Plausible to formulate this in the language of
rights.
Rights and utilitarianism
Even if talk of a new-born baby having a
right to life is inappropriate, there are very
strong utilitarian reasons why it would
normally be very wrong to kill a new-born
baby:
• It would prevent all the happiness which
that person could go on to experience.
• It would cause terrible grief and suffering
for the parents and others.
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
Are their similar utilitarian reasons for not
killing animals (e.g. for food)?
Perhaps. But:
• Farm animals would not enjoy any
pleasure at all if we did not rear them.
• The interests of the animal which is killed
can be outweighed by the greater good of
others.
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
We think it wrong to sacrifice the lives of
innocent human beings for the greater
good. A theory of rights seems to capture
this idea.
We might think it acceptable to sacrifice the
lives of some animals for the greater good
– e.g. deer-culling. A utilitarian theory
seems to fit this idea.
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
A utilitarian view of the moral status of
animals would focus not on the ‘right to
life’ but on their suffering.
A matter for empirical enquiry whether our
treatment of animals (e.g. rearing them for
food) causes suffering which is not
outweighed by any greater good.
Rights, utilitarianism and animals
Questions to consider:
If animals have a right to life, what are the practical
implications for
• our use of animals for food, and
• our use of animals for laboratory experiments?
What are the practical implications of utilitarianism
for
• our use of animals for food, and
• our use of animals for laboratory experiments?
Rights and moral status
We distinguished between having rights and
having moral status.
Is there a different view of the moral status of
animals, which is neither rights-based nor
utilitarian?
A different view of the value of life (human and
animal)? Cf. discussions of abortion and
euthanasia, idea of ‘the sanctity of life’.
Albert Schweitzer, ‘reverence for life’ – a feeling of
kinship with all living things?
Schweitzer on ‘reverence for life’
“...a system of values which concerns itself only with our
relationship to other people is incomplete and therefore
lacking in power for good. Only by means of reverence
for life can we establish a spiritual and humane
relationship with both people and all living creatures
within our reach. Only in this fashion can we avoid
harming others, and, within the limits of our capacity, go
to their aid whenever they need us… Through reverence
for life, we come into a spiritual relationship with the
universe. The inner depth of feeling we experience
through it gives us the will and the capacity to create a
spiritual and ethical set of values that enable us to act on
a higher plane, because we then feel ourselves truly at
home in our world.”
Reverence for life
Is this a better way of making sense of the
idea of moral concern for animals?
Unlike utilitarianism, a valuing of life as
such. But not dependent on the idea of
‘rights’ - not vulnerable to the objection
that it makes no sense to ascribe rights to
animals.
But what does it mean, and what are its
practical implications?