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Realist Phenomenal Epistemology
Matjaž Potrč, matjaz.potrc@guest.arnes.si
Knowledge is a matter of epistemic judgments, which constitutively include specific
phenomenology proper to the epistemic judging experiences. Phenomenological
experiences of epistemic judgment present knowledge as something objective and
independent from the judger. In this way phenomenology leads to an objective and realist
view of knowledge.
Infallible knowledge has its source in phenomenology or in what-it’s-like
experiences of epistemic judging. Epistemic certainty is based upon the intuition that is
close to the a priori and that supports objective realist treatment of knowledge.
Externalist epistemology looks for justification into external relations: this is the
epistemic descriptivist presupposition. Another influential presupposition sees knowledge
as a matter of definition. Both of these presuppositions are misguided in that they eschew
phenomenology and subsequently judgment as the basis for knowledge.
1. Judgment
Knowledge is a matter of epistemic judgments, which constitutively include specific
phenomenology proper to the epistemic judging experiences. Phenomenological
experiences of epistemic judgment present knowledge or whatever is known as
something objective and as independent from the judger. In this way phenomenology
leads to an objective and realist view of knowledge.1
Epistemic judgment
What is happening in the cases of knowledge that p, as opposed to cases figuring a mere
belief that p? The answer is that somebody judges to be in possession of knowledge that
p. Belief may come with the judgment as well, but with the kind of judgment that gets
fixed with a quite different quality.
Although it is easy for an unburdened eye to see that knowledge is a matter of
judgment, and namely of a specific epistemic judgment, the recognition of this fact was
impeded by powerful descriptive and definitory presuppositions dominating the
discussion in the area of epistemology. These presuppositions are shortly dealt with in the
final part of this paper.
Contrary to these presuppositions: If there is knowledge that p, i.e. that the cat is
on the mat (where p is “the cat is on the mat”), then someone judges that the cat is on the
mat. Someone commits herself to the claim regarding her epistemic certainty that p.
But isn’t such a judgment just a species of subjective whim, as against the
knowledge that needs to be supported in objective ways? Doesn’t judgment contain
phenomenology or specific what-it’s-like quality? And if so, isn’t it doomed to fail in its
attempt to reach knowledge – due to the fact that knowledge, whatever it is, needs to be
something objective, whereas by definition phenomenology is something subjective?
Phenomenology that is proper to epistemic judging experiences
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The term phenomenology as it is used here captures consciousness or what-it’slike quality that is proper to mental experiences. Conscious qualitative side of
such experiences may be called phenomenological, which means that it succeeds
with the specific what-it’s-like feeling coming along with somebody’s
entertaining of such experiences. In a similar way phenomenal epistemology
refers to an approach to knowledge whose basis is in conscious access by one who
is committed to the epistemic judgment, as opposed to the objectively descriptive
or definition based epistemology for which neither the judger, nor her act of
judgment or the phenomenology-consciousness related to the judgment come into
the center of attention and of investigation.2
Providing some examples of phenomenology or what-it’s-like qualitative
conscious experiences will help to clarify the issue. If I think about the cat, there
is a different qualitative or what-it’s-like experience coming with this thought as
compared to the what-it’s-like qualitative conscious quality of my experience
while I entertain a thought about a spider. We can say that phenomenology related
to the cat thought is different from the phenomenology related to the spider
thought.
Phenomenology or what-it’s-like qualitative conscious experience does
not only vary in respect to the intentional object or content. It also has the
function of reflexive consciousness, without which the intentional relation as such
could not get off the ground. Intertwinedness of mentally directed or intentional
acts and of their phenomenology coming as “the secondary object of perception”
characterizes the original account of intentional relation. Here is a succinct
summary:
Each act, whilst directed towards an object is at the same time and
besides this directed towards itself. Being presented with a ‘primary
object’, e.g., a sound, we are aware of being presented with something.
A psychological phenomenon as such always includes the
consciousness of itself as the ‘secondary object of perception’. As
certain as it is that no consciousness ever is without an intentional
relation, so it is certain… that the consciousness also, besides its object
of primary relation, has itself as a secondary object. This secondary
inner perception is a true, self-referential, evident perception in the
strict sense. (Baumgartner, 1996: 32)
It is easy to see that there is specific consciousness or phenomenology related to the
intentional object, and that at the same time there is the specific phenomenology related
to the act of reflexive consciousness. Intentional relation, thus, constitutively includes the
specific phenomenology or conscious what-it’s-like quality connected with the
intentional object (cat related phenomenology is different from the spider related
phenomenology). And it also includes specific phenomenology related to the
consciousness of oneself at the time of someone’s thinking about the primary object.
One may ask oneself: what-it’s-like to be aware of thinking about the cat? What is
the phenomenological quality of entertaining a cat related thought? As it may be seen
from this consideration, we do not just deal with consciousness accompanying the
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content/object related mental act. We deal with reflexive consciousness that is the very
precondition of intentional relation. Without the phenomenology including awareness of
being directed at something, without the conscious mind, and without reflexive
consciousness proper to a specific mental act, there would be no directedness at the
“primary” intentional object at all. In mereological talk: a thought is an accidental whole
with the thinker (basically supporting reflexive consciousness) as its only proper part.
(Potrč 1995, 1996) Without the thinker and her reflexive consciousness enabling the
intentional relation, this last one would not be possible.
In a more superficial manner, we may approach the quality of reflexive
consciousness in terms of attitude, the attitude being judger-related and not so much
object-related. We may then say that phenomenology or qualitative what-it’s-like
experiences will be different for someone loving or hating cats, and that they will vary
along the situation in which the subject happens to entertain her thought. And finally
there comes the question to what extent object related phenomenology might be separated
from the reflexive consciousness related phenomenology. One may presume that the
specific quality of phenomenology at a certain experiential moment (which can again
only be an abstraction form the experiential continuum) comes from the background of
these various merging dimensions. This merging background also provides testimony
about their metaphysical constituency.
Further and closer to our concerns, it is natural to expect that just entertaining a
thought that p will come with different phenomenology or what-it’s-like conscious
experience as will be the case for the judgment that p. In other words, there is a specific
phenomenology or conscious what-it’s-like qualitative experience of entertaining a
thought or of falling judgment that p. Just entertaining a thought has different
phenomenology, or different conscious quality as believing that p. And similarly, there
will be a clear qualitative or what-it’s-like phenomenological experiential difference
between someone’s believing that p and between her knowing that p.3 Let us call the
phenomenology coming with knowing that p a specific epistemic phenomenology. Now,
epistemic phenomenology certainly seems to be related to judgment. Whatever a
judgment should be, knowing that p certainly seems to involve some kind of judgment.
And judgment, again, comes with the specific phenomenology or with specific conscious
qualitative what-it’s-like feeling proper to someone experiencing it. An entrance to the
epistemic phenomenology, to see what it is actually about, might be provided by trying to
answer to the question what is the testimony of epistemic phenomenology. In other
words, what is it like to have the specific conscious or qualitative feeling to know that p
(in opposition, say, of just entertaining a thought concerning p). It seems to us that one
distinctive testimony of epistemic phenomenology (as in opposition to the doxatic or just
belief bound phenomenology) is a clear feeling that whatever is known is real and
independently objective in respect to the judger’s subjective whims and desires. This is a
topic to which we will return in a moment.
Let us rehearse some points. Phenomenology certainly is inherent to the
judgment. If I judge to know that the cat is on the mat, there is a specific phenomenology
or qualitative experience coming with it. And this quality or what-it’s-like experience is
different from the one inherent to my knowledge that the spider is crawling upon the
wall. This is in respect to the variation in the quality of epistemic judgment coming along
the change of content related to what is being judged.
3
There is also a special quality or what-it’s-like proper to the epistemic judgment
itself, in opposition to other kinds of judgment. Someone’s judging involved into her
belief that p, or someone’s judging in respect to her desire that p is different from her
judging that she possesses knowledge about p. Each of these has a specific qualitative or
what-it’s-like experience inherent to it that is different from all other cases.
Phenomenology or what-it’s-like experience of someone’s judging to know that p
is a specific matter that goes along with the type of judgment in question. It is natural that
once we admit judgment as central to the epistemological enterprise, we also accept a
specific kind of phenomenology or what-it’s-like experience coming with that kind of
judgment and perhaps constitutive for it. But here also seems to lay the main difficulty
that was already alluded to: the disparity between the claims of objectivity which seems
characteristic for knowledge, and between the irreducibly subjective characters of
phenomenology. What-it’s-like experience is the most subjective matter that there can be,
it is the mark of the first person’s perspective.4
Phenomenological testimony leads towards an objective and realist view of knowledge
Given the worry that phenomenological experience constitutively inherent to judgment
clashes with the objective and possibly with realist pretensions of knowledge, one should
better take a look at the testimony provided by these phenomenological experiences
themselves, as they come involved into judgments of knowledge.
What is the specificity of my judgment knowing that p in counter distinction with
my judgment of just believing that p? One specificity seem to be in the clear qualitative
or what-it’s-like feeling of my epistemic certainty in respect to p. My phenomenological
experience related to my judgment of knowing that p presents to me p as something
objective, and certain, in a full independence in respect to my subjective whims.
Compare this to the quality or what-it’s-like experience as related to my judgment as to
my belief that p. In this last case the phenomenological quality going along with
judgment indeed presents to me my firm yet subjective commitment to p. Contrary to
this, my judgmental commitment to p in the case of my knowing that p presents itself to
me phenomenologically as something quite independent from myself, and as objective.
So, despite the beginning worry that the introduction of phenomenology has to
reduce knowledge to something subjective, thereby impeding it to act as knowledge at
all, the attention paid to the experience of phenomenology, the attention to what-it’s-like
to judge an act as a case of knowledge (contrary to judging it to be a case of a mere
belief), shows clear phenomenological experiential commitment to an objective and
realist view of knowledge.
But isn’t all this building established upon a whim of subjective consciousness
after all – despite that the attention to the testimony of phenomenology leads us towards
objective and realist pretensions?
2. Infallibility and realism
Infallible knowledge has its source in phenomenology or in what-it’s-like of epistemic
judging experiences. Epistemic certainty is based upon the intuition that is close to the a
priori and it supports objective and realist treatment of knowledge.
Infallible knowledge
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Knowledge is not just belief. So one needs to be attentive at what distinguishes
knowledge from the mere belief. Is knowledge a justified true belief, and thereby an
epistemically improved doxatic state? Does true belief reside in belief’s correspondence
to the world? Perhaps truth itself should be rather considered as correct assertibility, i.e.
as a kind of contextually correct judgment. (Horgan-Potrč, 2006) What is the question of
justification? What kind of knowledge needs justification? This may be knowledge aimed
at the empirical world. Another kind of knowledge may not need justification though,
because of the nature proper to the area where it applies, that of the reflexive
consciousness or phenomenology. The answers aimed to satisfy questions about
knowledge as justified true belief depend on presuppositions that will be shortly tackled
in the final part of this paper, the presuppositions of descriptive and definitory nature of
knowledge. Gettier’s problem may be a problem just for someone buying these
presuppositions, both of which clash with judgmental approach to knowledge.
One answer to the question about the difference between belief and knowledge is
that, in opposition to belief, knowledge is characterized by infallibility. It is the case that
what one just believes will always be able to fail. Whereas knowledge is committed to
infallibility.
So, where can epistemic infallibility reside? The answer may be sought in
external relations. Does not a crucial part of my claim to the knowledge that p, in counter
distinction to the mere belief that p, reside in justification coming independently of my
belief that p? And is it not a normal procedure to search for this independency in those
relations that are external to my belief, in respect to which, as residing in the external
world, my belief happens to be justified? The answer to this question, unhappily, turns
out to be negative. Let us just state briefly that, in respect to the situation in the external
world, about which one claims to have knowledge there is always at least a slight
possibility of epistemic failure. There is the possibility that my judgment as to the
knowledge about situations in the external world gets falsified by some unsuspected
empirical change, or by my ultimate failure to provide myself the real foolproof epistemic
access to the external fact.
One is thereby led to look for the basis of infallibility not in relation to the
external world but in the realm of the mental. I may always be in fallible relation to the
externally existing cats and mats. But at least it seems that I can be certain, in an
infallible manner, that I entertain belief about the cat and the mat. It turns out however
that infallible knowledge needs to be further restricted: not just to the mental, but to the
singular present phenomenally given and constitutive states (Horgan-Kriegel, in press),
thus to the phenomenological or what-it’s-like qualitative experiences with epistemic
claim. So phenomenology does not only provide support for objective and realist
knowledge. Phenomenology also itself constitutes, presents the case of infallible
knowledge. This is one more reason to take knowledge as judgment in a serious way, for
phenomenology certainly seems to be inherent in judgment. And it is difficult to see how
phenomenology would be inherently constitutive to the approaches to knowledge that are
based on different fundaments than the one of judgment.
Intuition and realism
The question to ask now is what provides infallibility to the epistemic judgment. One
answer is that this is intuition. At least such an answer goes well together with the focus
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upon the epistemic judgment as basic for knowledge claims, and with phenomenology
being constitutively present in such kinds of judgments.
But what is intuition? Let us check it for the case of knowledge that is being
discussed right now. As you judge that you know that p, there is certainty of the
qualitative phenomenological what-it’s-like feeling for you to know that comes from
intuition, as intuition.
Intuition, although related in this manner constitutively to phenomenology, has
claim to objectivity and realism. In order to grasp this, consider that intuition is close to a
priori. “1+1=2” and “Red is different from green” are statements of a priori truths. As
you judge though, in respect to such truths, the quality, what-it’s-like of your judgment or
its phenomenology, pushes you to admit, it shows you that in these judgments, the reality
is given quite independently of yourself, i.e. in a manner that is independent of your
judgment, and of your knowledge. The phenomenology related to your judgment shows
you that “1+1=2” as something that you know is objective and independent from you.
The infallibility and reliability of knowledge that you obtain in this manner is
independent of yourself and it is realist. Justification as independence, mentioned in the
previous section, is thus preserved as a precondition for infallibility and thus of
knowledge – by embracing intuition. A realist approach to knowledge also gets
established in this way.
3. Description and definition
Externalist epistemology looks for justification into external relations: this is the
epistemic descriptivist presupposition. Another influential presupposition sees knowledge
as a matter of definition. Both of these presuppositions are misguided in that they eschew
phenomenology and subsequently the judgment as basic for knowledge.
There is a misguiding presupposition as well that externalism and its descriptive
direction is the only way to reach realism. But realism is actually incompatible with
externalism, for the simple reason that externalism cannot lead to knowledge at all; on the
other hand phenomenology is well able to support both knowledge and realist
epistemology.
Descriptivist presupposition
Judgment and its constitutive phenomenology are thus basic for epistemology, as the
above short investigation has indicated. Specific phenomenology proper to epistemic
judgment leads to the infallible knowledge of an independent and objective realist kind.
These simple truths tend to be downplayed and actually rejected by powerful
presuppositions that are at work in epistemology as it is widely known nowadays. We
will direct attention at the descriptivist and definitory presuppositions, which both deny
recognition of epistemic judgment and its phenomenology as being basic for knowledge.
We think that these presuppositions are both deeply misguided as to the real judgmental
and phenomenological basis of knowledge. The first of these presuppositions was already
alluded to, and here is a trial to spell it out in a preliminary manner:
(Des) Knowledge is based upon external or objective justified relations between
beliefs and situations in the world that these beliefs describe.
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The simple idea behind this is that knowledge has to be something more than belief, and
as belief is someone’s cognitive act, knowledge needs to transcend this cognitive act by
supplementing a justification for it either directly in the external world, or through
securing the means of reaching this external world. So turning belief into knowledge
needs to add a justified description to the mere cognitive doxatic state.
In other words: Presupposition (Des) deals with beliefs that are unfit in respect to
the high epistemic standards, with the need that they should be improved into knowledge.
By what means? By securing a descriptive adequacy between these beliefs and between
their corresponding situations in the world.
If one takes epistemic judgment and its inherent phenomenology (comprising
realist claim) as basic for knowledge, one will hesitate to start with belief as an epistemic
(and not intentional) insufficient entity, to be improved upon (justified) by the available
means of external connections.
As already mentioned though, the main failure of presupposition (Des) lyes in
establishing justification by external relations. And we have already hinted that access to
these empirical matters will always have to stay fallible. But fallibility does not accord
with knowledge. And so (Des) impedes reaching knowledge. (Des) sees relations to
establish justificatory link to knowledge as external, and again, such relations will turn
out to be fallible. To provide just one example: naturalist knowledge information based
claim (Dretske, 1981) seems to be supported by the presupposition (Des).
Definitory presupposition
But here is another powerful presupposition that is especially lethal for recognizing the
real judgmental and phenomenological nature of knowledge. It is the definitory
presupposition. It may be approached in the following manner:
(Def) Knowledge has to satisfy definitory conditions for justified true belief.
First, we think that it is wrong to approach knowledge by definitory means, given that its
nature is judgmental and qualitative, in a special epistemic manner. Each knowledge is a
case of genuine judgment, and the nature of this one cannot be reached by definitory
conditions. Gettier industry did not establish ultimate conditions for knowledge. Second,
neither belief as a deficient epistemic state, nor the truth and its justification by external
bonds will be able to count as knowledge. And so will fail a similar attempt provided by
their conjunction, or by the conjunction supplemented with Gettier conditions.
An especially interesting figure in this respect is Chisholm (1966). He adopts
evidence as the basis for knowledge in his foundationalist enterprise. But as he embraces
the definitory approach he falls short of recognizing judgmental and phenomenological
intertwined nature of knowledge. But this is wrong. In your knowing that p, you possess a
fully phenomenologically supported judgment about (your) knowledge, and you do not
have at all to do with generalist definitory conditions. Yes, by the way, the judgment
pertaining to knowledge and involving phenomenology will be of particularist and not of
a generalist nature, as the definitory approach with its (Def) is eager to suggest.
In fact, by embracing (Def), you are on the way to embrace reductionist
presupposition (Des) as well, as you try to secure links between atomistic parts of
definition. (Des) and (Def), in fact, come as a package deal.5
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As you stick to (Des) and (Def) you are bound to deny the constitutive role of
phenomenology for knowledge, and thereby its lesson leading to appropriating
knowledge’s realism and objectivity, which is obtained in an infallible way, intuition like.
You are bound to become an epistemic reductionist zombie. You reduce knowledge to
external conditions, by preference. But fallibility will still be there. You can only avoid it,
and reach to knowledge by embracing a full blooded phenomenologically supported
epistemic judgment.
There may be even a lesson for other areas from here, such as for the area of
inquiry into the nature of intentionality. The thesis of intentionality of phenomenology
and of phenomenology of intentionality (Horgan-Tienson, 2002), though preserving its
right in respect to the view that separates each of these factors from others, seems to be
too short. The constitutive role of phenomenology in intentionality, say, will only be
adequately captured by judgment. The just mentioned theses, to the contrary, succeed just
in half hearted manner to overcome the atomistic approach.
Here is the main credo, though: If you happen to know something, you do not
describe, and you do not define; you fall a judgment.
There is a misguided presupposition that externalism and its descriptive direction
provides the only way for reaching realism. But this is wrong. Realism is actually
incompatible with externalism, for the simple reason that externalism cannot lead to
knowledge at all. Knowledge is intentionally supported cognitive and judgmental
relation. (Potrč, In press a, In press b). And phenomenology is well able to support both
knowledge and realist epistemology.6
Bibliography
Audi, R. 1998. Epistemology. London: Routledge.
Baumgartner, W. 1996. On the Origins of Phenomenology: Franz Brentano. In
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, E. Baumgartner (ed.). Dettelbach: Roell: pp. 2535.
Chisholm, R. 1966. Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Goldman, A. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Horgan, T. and Kriegel, U. In print. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness
that we May Know it so Well?
Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. 2006. Abundant Truth in an Austere World. In M. Lynch and P.
Greenough (eds.) Truth and Realism: New Essays. Oxford: University Press.
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Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 2002. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the
Phenomenology of Intentionality. In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
Readings. D. Chalmers (ed.). Oxford University Press: pp. 520-33.
Potrč, M. 1995. Pojavi in psihologija: fenomenološki spisi. Ljubljana: ZIFF.
Potrč, M. 1996. Phenomenology and Organic Unity. In Phenomenology and Cognitive
Science, E. Baumgartner (ed.). Dettelbach: Roell: pp. 185-97.
Potrč, M. In press a. Intentional Knowledge.
Potrč, M. In press b. Phenomenological Basis of Epistemology.
Notes
1
The relation between judgmental and objective nature of knowledge claims is essential. Once as
knowledge claims are recognized as being judgment based, they are supposed to involve phenomenology,
because judgments do involve phenomenology. The testimony of phenomenology is to the objectivity of
epistemic experiences: the what-it’s-like of epistemic judgments phenomenology provides testimony of
knowledge claims touching something objective and independent from the judger (perhaps as opposed to
the mere belief claims).
2
Phenomenology and conscious experiences are thus taken here as something quite close and equivalent,
which will do for the matter of this investigation. It does not need to be the case however that
phenomenology would necessarily match the area of consciousness, or even what-it’s-like qualitative side
of experiences.
3
An important neglected area of epistemological inquiry is gathering of the data characterizing epistemic
judgment, as opposed to other kinds of judgments. A reason for this may lie in neglecting both particular
and objective nature of the realm to which such a judgment provides access.
4
The disparity between subjective and objective in phenomenology gets bridged once as presuppositions
of descriptive and definitory nature of knowledge get abandoned, judgment is taken as important for the
knowledge claim, it is realized that judgment contains phenomenology, and that the quality of this
phenomenology leads to objective and judger independent realm of epistemic facts.
5
Several times, (Des) is taken as capturing the cognitive and other empirical presuppositions of knowledge
and this is then more or less successfully supplemented by (Def) account of knowledge. (See first and
second parts of Goldman 1986 and Audi 1998).
6
I would like to thank for their support and feedback to W. Baumgartner, T. Horgan, A. Pogačnik, S.
Sajama and V. Strahovnik.
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