Investing in the Moment
Iran and its terrorist proxies in the region are currently experiencing their greatest setback, finding
themselves at their most vulnerable. Simultaneously, this moment highlights the extent of the
political and social fragility within the region's structures, which have been subject to infiltration
and fragmentation—strategies that Tehran has exploited over the years.
Observers of the political trajectory of the ruling clique in Tehran can sense the imminent danger,
particularly after the neutralization of its key assets. These include Hezbollah in Lebanon—
Tehran’s largest investment—followed by the potential downfall of Assad's brutal regime, its most
costly endeavor, and the military collapse of the terrorist Hamas organization in Gaza.
At this very juncture, fully aware of the limitations of their regional influence and their successive
losses, Iranian leaders have recognized the necessity of opening up to the new U.S. administration.
Their aim is to gamble on potential concessions, which, while painful, may yield the expected
return of preserving the regime’s survival and stability.
It is not unlikely that Iran may offer trade-offs for stability in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea.
Simultaneously, it will likely test Trump's doctrine of avoiding future wars by appealing to its
domestic audience and its terrorist Revolutionary Guard to rehabilitate its image—something it
has lost in recent years.
One can now anticipate the shape of the political class Tehran is preparing to manage this file. It
is likely to rely on the Iranian intelligentsia in the U.S., particularly, and in Europe more generally,
along with the financial and economic incentives it will extend to parties collaborating with it to
build a renewed image if it succeeds in its latest endeavor.
However, a historical review of Tehran’s relationship with the West reveals a consistent pattern.
While its tools may evolve, its core remains fixed: adherence to the principle of exporting the
revolution, threatening the unique structure of Middle Eastern states, and blackmailing Western
countries across the board.
This approach is sustained through the logic of the suicidal player and the adoption of zero-sum
strategies. Furthermore, Iran has based its understanding of managing conflicts and securing its
vital sphere on non-state and terrorist organizations in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen,
Bahrain, and Morocco. Additionally, its activities extend to Central Asia, including Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and its relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Therefore, it is expected that Iran will make whatever sacrifices are necessary to keep its regime
alive, even if it means imposing additional pressures on its own population.
Observers of Iranian affairs now see that the economic conditions are incongruent with those of
an oil-producing country. Iran is likely to adopt a strategy similar to the Assad regime in Syria,
relying on buying time and gambling on changing circumstances in its favor.
This approach, however, is not in the interest of the region’s people. It poses a serious, added threat
to stability, peace, and the development of relationships between Middle Eastern states.