Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021
PY1011 Moral & Political Controversies
Moral status of non-human animals
Lecture 3:
Do we have moral obligations to other animals?
(What is the moral status of non-human animals?)
We human beings often tend to treat other animals as if they are mere means to our ends – as if we can
use them however we like, for our own purposes. Are we justified in this?
Do non-human animals have moral status?
Depends on what we think the criteria for moral status are.
Form of argument:
o To possess moral status, one must have features X, Y, Z
o Nonhuman animals do have (or, do not have) X, Y, Z
o Therefore, nonhuman animals do (or, do not) have moral status
Criteria for moral status (version 1)
Kantian ethics approach:
P1: To possess moral status, one must be a rational, autonomous agent (capable of critical selfawareness and the ability to manipulate complex concepts).
P2: Nonhuman animals are not rational, autonomous agents in this sense.
C: Therefore, nonhuman animals do not have moral status.
Responses:
Deny premise 2 (some animals have these capacities)
Deny premise 1 (some humans do not have these capacities)
Argument from Marginal Cases
(denying premise 1):
What about infant, or severely impaired, or (permanently) unconscious human beings? They are
not capable of critical self-reflection, etc.
Should they then be excluded from the moral community?
Note: If they were not excluded, but nonhuman animals still were, then surely this would be an
instance of prejudice based on mere species-membership.
[more on this later]
Kant on Animals
While rationality makes us persons, animals are just things.
“Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature have, nevertheless, if they are
not rational beings, only a relative value as means and are therefore called things. On the
other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out
as ends in themselves” (Groundwork IV, 428)
Humans are “altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals,
with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.” (Groundwork VII: 127)
It Kant be that bad…?
Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021
Kant does actually think we should treat animals nicely, but has to explain why in a strange way.
We should be kind to animals for our own sake.
Rehabilitating Kant?
Several Kantians have attempted to say sensible things about animals, while maintaining a broadly
Kantian framework.
For an example, see Christine Korsgaard (2005)
Think back to this issue when you’re learning about Kant’s ethics in Week 5!
Criteria for moral status (Version 2)
‘Moral agency’ approach (contractual):
P1: To possess moral status, one must be capable of functioning in a moral community, which means
having rights and responsibilities – this is what being a member of a moral community means.
P2: Nonhuman animals cannot function in a moral community (e.g. they do not have moral obligations
to any other animals)
C: Therefore they should not be accorded moral status.
Response:
Argument from Marginal Cases again – deny P1
Regan’s moral patients view:
Infants and cognitively impaired adults cannot be considered full moral agents, but they may
still be accorded moral status – they are moral patients.
Moral patients are creatures with morally significant interests, even if they require others to
defend those interests on their behalf. Nonhuman animals, like infant and severely impaired
humans, are moral patients.
Bentham (1789):
“The day may come when the rest of animal creation may acquire those rights which never
could have been with-holden from them but by the hand of tyranny.
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human
being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.
It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or
the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive
being to the same fate.”
“What else is it that could trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the
faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as
well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old.
But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason nor
Can they talk but, Can they suffer?”
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789
Criteria for moral status (version 3):
Utilitarian approach:
P1: To possess moral status, one must have the capacity for welfare and suffering
P2: Nonhuman animals have the capacity for welfare and suffering
Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021
C: Therefore, nonhuman animals have moral status
Singer – All animals are equal
Peter Singer’s ‘All Animals are Equal’ extends Bentham’s argument.
He notes that long ago, only certain rich white men had rights.
We have extended the notion of rights.
We accept that certain ‘isms’ – racism, sexism, etc. – were (and are) wrong.
But there’s still one more that we don’t seem to even acknowledge …
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of
their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of
another race.
Sexists violate the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex.
Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of
members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case.
Most human beings are speciesists. …
[O]rdinary human beings – not a few exceptionally cruel or heartless humans, but the
overwhelming majority of humans – take an active part in, acquiesce in, and allow their taxes to
pay for practices that require the sacrifice of the most important interests of members of other
species in order to promote the most trivial interests of our own species
Singer: all animals are equal
What Singer is emphasising is something that we should all recognise: the Principle of Equality.
This principle is at the very heart of modern, liberal thinking.
Yet people often misunderstand what this principle espouses. It’s important to be clear on what this
principle means, and what it entails …
The Principle of Equality – with respect to humans
The P of E is NOT the claim that all humans ARE equal – we differ in many respects: intelligence,
strength, beauty, abilities, moral virtue, etc.
So, the P of E is not a claim about the factual equality of all humans.
It should be understood instead as a claim about how humans ought to be treated: they should
(generally) be treated as equals.
The Principle of Equality – with respect to humans
But: if people actually are different, why should they be treated as equals?
 Answer: Where there are relevant differences, people can be treated differently. Where there
are not relevant differences, people should be treated alike – justice demands this.
The Principle of Equality – generally
Individuals should be treated in the same way unless there is a relevant difference between them
that justifies a difference in treatment
But which differences are relevant and which are not?
We need to supplement the P of E with an account of what the relevant differences are.
EXAMPLE
What would be relevant differences in these situations?
 Medical attention on arrival at the emergency room of the hospital
 Selecting a candidate for an academic scholarship from the financial hardship fund
Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021
Whether a difference between individuals justifies a difference in treatment depends upon the kind of
treatment that is in question.
A difference that justifies one kind of difference in treatment need not justify another.
Implication:
There is no one big difference between individuals that will be relevant to justifying all differences in
treatment. Which differences matter depends upon what treatment is in question.
 Many thinkers have tended to overlook this
We are justified in treating animals differently in some respects
 We don’t have to admit pigs and horses to universities, or give them the vote …
But in other respects, we are not
 That an individual is a non-human animal does not matter when it comes to, say, inflicting
pain/causing suffering/torture
Singer – all animals are equal
Singer thinks there is no relevant difference.
So we should regard all animals as having equal moral status (so long as they have the capacity for
pleasure/pain).
That’s all it should take, to enter into our moral considerations.
Another (more moderate?) utilitarian position
Frey’s ‘unequal value’ thesis
3 compatible propositions:
 Animal life has some value
 Not all animal life has the same value
 Human life is more valuable than animal life
Frey denies that this position relies on speciesism:
“…some ways of trying to differentiate the value of human from animal life in the past seem
pretty clearly to be speciesist. But not all ways are; the important option set out above – one
that construes the value of a life as a function of its quality, its quality as a function of its
richness, and its richness as a function of its capacity of enrichment – does not use species
membership to determine the value of lives. Indeed, it quite explicitly allows for the possibility
that some animal life may be more valuable than some human life.
(Frey, “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism”, p.185 in LaFollette).
Frey’s ‘unequal value’ thesis: implications
Frey supports vivisection because of the huge benefits that humans may enjoy as a result.
Because humans are worth more than animals, benefits to us can outweigh the suffering for animals (at
least sometimes).
But, as animal life still has value, we shouldn’t treat them cruelly, and we should only sacrifice them
when there are large benefits to be gained.
However, other implications also follow …
“Indeed, it quite explicitly allows for the possibility that some animal life may be more
valuable than some human life.” (185)
“What justifies the medical/scientific use of perfectly healthy rabbits instead of humans with a
low quality of life? If, for example, experiments on retinas are suggested, why use rabbits or
Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021
chimps instead of defective humans with otherwise excellent retinas? I know of nothing that
cedes human life of any quality, however low, greater value than animal life of any quality,
however high. If, therefore, we are going to justify medical/scientific uses of animals by appeal
to the value of their lives, we open up directly the possibility of our having to envisage the use
of humans of a lower quality of life in preference to animals of a higher quality of life.”
 Human experimentation? Is this a palatable consequence?
Further arguments
A good source for additional arguments is LaFollette’s Ethics in Practice.
As well as Singer and Frey’s arguments, this also features some discussions of whether animals have
rights:
 Tom Regan: animals have rights because they have “inherent value”
 Carl Cohen: Animals have no rights, because rights are a human institution.
 Older versions of LaFollette also include “The Moral Community” by Michael Fox: he argues
that the concept of rights has been stretched too far, and that ‘kinship’ justifies different moral
treatment of humans and non-human animals … (speciesist?)
Summing up
Some moral approaches do not accord moral status to non-human animals (Kantian ethics, contractbased ethics).
Consequentialism (and utilitarianism in particular) can do so more easily.
Following Bentham, utilitarians can acknowledge that the suffering of animals matters – which seems
right!
 Singer’s particular take, that all animals are equal, is often seen as controversial.
 A more moderate utilitarian position – like Frey’s – might look more appealing.
o However, that too has some implications that many would find unpalatable.
Bibliography
Bentham, Jeremy (1789): An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
Fox, Michael (2002): “The Moral Community” in Ethics in Practice, 2nd edition, Hugh Lafollette (ed.),
Blackwell, pp.117-127.
Frey, R. G. (2014): “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism”, in Ethics in Practice, 4th edition,
Hugh Lafollette (ed.), pp.181-191.
Kant, Immanuel, [1785] 1998: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
Sitten), Mary J. Gregor (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kant, Immanuel [1784-5]: Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant). P. Heath
and J.B. Schneewind (ed. and trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–222.
Korsgaard, Christine (2005): “Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals”, The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values
Singer, Peter (2014): “All Animals are Equal” in Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, fourth edition, Hugh
Lafollette (ed.), Blackwell, pp.172-180.
Thursday Live@five! Q&A session
 Live on Teams at 5pm – I will start the session, join once it’s started
 Ask questions in the session OR post in advance (by 4pm)
 Post questions on the forum on MOODLE in the Week 1 thread
See you Thursday!
Dr Lisa Jones
September 2021