Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
Author(s): Richard Swinburne
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 287-311
Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume 18, Number 2, June 1988, pp. 287-312
287
DoesTheismNeeda Theodicy?
RICHARDSWINBURNE
Oriel College
University of Oxford
Oxford 0X1 4EW
Great Britain
I
To many atheists the existence of evil seems to provide a conclusive
argumentagainst the existence of God. God is by definition omnipotent and perfectly good; a perfectly good being will remove evil in so
far as he can, an omnipotent being can remove any evil he chooses,
so if there is a God there will be no evil, but there is evil, hence there
is no God. Theists normally challenge this argument by challenging
the premiss that a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as
he can. The theistic defence is usually put as the defence that many
evils are logically necessary conditions of greatergoods, and hence a
perfectlygood being may allow them to occur in order to bring about
the greatergood; so a perfectlygood being may well allow some evils
to occur.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether it is enough for
the theist formallyto make this point, in orderto render the argument
from evil harmless, or whether evil nevertheless 'counts against' the
existence of God, in the absence of a demonstration with respect to
each known evil what greater good it serves; whether the 'counts
against' can be analysed as 'makes less probable';and to determine
at what point evil makes belief that there is a God irrational.However, the defenceneeds to be phrasedmorecarefully.First,for some evils,
even if that evil is a necessaryconditionof a greatergood, agents would
have no rightever to bringthem aboutfor the sake of the greatergood.
A beating may do some child much good, and that amount of suffering might even be logically necessary to effect that particulargood;
but, unless I am the child's parent or teacher, I do not have the right
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Richard Swinburne
to beat the child for the sake of that good. The evils which the perfectly good being does not attemptto prevent must be ones which he has
the right to allow to occur. Second, the logically necessary condition
of the greatergood may not be the actual occurrenceof the evils, but
some agent P having the power to cause them to occur without being
caused to exercise that power or being caused to refrainfrom exercising that power (e.g., P having the power intentionallyto bring about
evil, and not being subjectto causes which determine how he will exercise that power; which I shall call his having libertarianfree will).
For such a reason a perfectly good being may not attempt to prevent
another agent bringing about evil, even though the actualoccurrence
of the evil is not a necessaryconditionof the greatergood. And, third,
we must avoid phrasingthe defence so as to imply that a perfectlygood
being will maximise the quantity of goodness in the world in so far
as he can. For, plausibly, there is no maximumto the amount of goodness in the world - however many beings were enjoying the world,
the world might be better for the existence of another such being in
some distant place or other space. The perfect goodness of an agent
is, I suggest, not a matter of his acting so as to maximise the number
of good states of affairs, but acting so as to bring about many good
states of affairs, so as always to fulfil his obligations, and so as to remove any evil which he can remove without removingan equallygreat
(or greater)good. (Fulfillingone's obligations is a matter of performing all positive duties [such as keeping promises] and refrainingfrom
performingwhat one does not have the right to do [such as stealing].)
That at any rate seems the minimum requirementif an agent is to be
perfectlygood; a stricterrequirementwould requirea strongerdefence
from the theist. These points being made, the theist can rightly object
to the premiss 'a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he
can' by claiming that all that the atheist is entitled to in this context
is 'a perfectly good being will remove evil in so far as he can, unless
allowing that evil to occur is something which he has the right to do,
and which is such that allowing it or an equallybad evil to occurmakes
possible, and is the only morallypermissibleway in which he can make
possible, the occurrenceof a state of affairsat least as good as the evil
is bad, and he does bring about that occurrence.'I shall in future use
the simple phrase which I used before, that a perfectlygood being may
allow evils to occur for the sake of a greatergood, but understand by
it the careful spelling-out which I have just given.
Since all things are possible for an omnipotentbeing, except the logically impossible, the theist's defence in this context is then that God
might well allow evil to occur, caused either by himself or by some
other agent, in orderto bring about the occurrenceof a good for which
allowing it to occur is logically necessary. He might well allow me to
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Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
289
suffer a hangover after drinkingwhisky, because if he does not allow
me to suffer the hangover, it will not be possible for me to have had
the libertarianfree will of choosing whether to drinkwhisky and have
a hangover, or not to drink whisky and have no hangover, in such
a way that my choice either way would be efficacious. Libertarianfree
will efficaciousin affecting our own futures is such a good thing that
God might allow us the consequences of our bad choices. That there
are some evils which a perfectlygood being might allow to occur, even
if he could prevent them, seems evident to me and, I suspect, to most
atheists.
The real issue is: are all the actualevils in the world such that a God
could allow them to occur, compatiblywith his perfectgoodness. First,
is each kind of evil such that he would have the right to allow it sometimes to occur, even if it serves some great good? Does he have the
right to allow children to suffer pain for the sake of some good for
others, or even for themselves? And, second, if God has such a right
only under certaincircumstances,do those circumstancesobtain?For
example,if he has the rightto makechildrensufferonly if there is some
balance of pleasure over pain in their lives, is there such a balance?
Third,is each evil such that to allow its occurrenceis one way of bringing about a logically necessary condition of a state of affairs at least
as good as the evil is bad? Is allowing animal pain a way of bringing
about a logically necessary condition of any state as good as the evil
is bad?It makes it possible for humans to choose freely (i.e., with libertarianfree will) to show compassion to animals. Perhaps their having
this kind of efficaciouschoice is a good as greatas the evil which makes
it possible is bad. But, fourth, is allowing the occurrenceof the evil
(or the occurrenceof an evil equallybad) the only morallypermissible
way of bringing about that logically necessary condition of that good?
Is there no less costly way to achievethe goal?God could make human
compassionate actions possible by deceiving humans into supposing
that animals were suffering when they were not. But, plausibly, such
large-scaledeception about the feelings of other creatures,leading to
quite unjustified sympathy and compassionate action, would not be
morallypermissible. In that case the only morallypermissibleway in
which God could bring about a logically necessary condition of compassionate action, viz. animals seeming to suffer, is by actually making them suffer, and that involves theiractualpain or pain equallybad.
Finally, does the good state of affairs,which the evil makes possible,
actuallyoccur?If there is a God, has he broughtabout, or will he bring
about, that good? Suppose that the evil of animal suffering is to be
justifiedby the fact that it makes possible the good of men having the
opportunityfreelyto show compassiontowardssufferinganimals.God
could not make any manfreelyshow compassion - for the well-known
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Richard Swinburne
reason that libertarianfree will is incompatiblewith predetermination.
Buthe could give men the libertarianfree will, having which is a necessary condition of their using it compassionately. So do they have that
free will? In so far as an after-life,or the existence of angels with libertarianfree will of a kind that allows them to choose evil, are necessary
for allowing some evil to make possible some good, is there an afterlife, or do such angels exist? I summarize the issue by asking: are all
evils in the world such that a 'greatergood' defence works in respect
of them?
Many an inquirercannot see how a 'greatergood' defence does work
with respect to all occurrentevils. Often an evil seems to be such that
it would be wrong for God ever (or in existing circumstances)to permit it for the sake of any greatergood; or that it does not make possible any greatergood; or that, if it does, there is a betterway of making
that good possible; or that the good for which the evil is a necessary
condition does not in fact occur.
It will be importantfor me to distinguishamong the inquirer'sdoubts
between moral doubts and doubts about contingent non-moral fact,
and for this purpose I need to establisha position on the status of moral
judgments.11hold that they have truth-value;some are true and some
are false. I do not need to argue for that aspect of my position in this
context, since anyone who thinks that evil raises for theism the 'problem' which I have described must think this. There could only arise
an issue as to whether certainevils were compatible
with the existence
of a good God if goodness and evil were properties which belonged
to persons, actions,and states of affairs,and judgmentswhich affirmed
or denied their possession had a truth value.
Now the moral goodness (or otherwise) of particularactions is supervenient on non-moralfeaturesof those actions. Thatis, judgments
such as 'Youought to fight for France,'It would be good to give money
to Oxfam,' derive their truth-value from contingent states of affairs
describablein non-moralterms, i.e. (in Mooreanterms)'natural'states.
What would make the first true would be such things as you being
a French citizen, and Francebeing attackedby an enemy who seeks
to rule her; what would make the second true would be such things
as that Oxfam feeds the starving in Africabut does not have enough
money for this purpose. But once all the naturalcircumstanceswhich
make the moraljudgment true are set out, that in those circumstances
(fully described)you ought to fight for France,or it is good to give to
1 What follows for the next two pages is a condensed view of the position advocated in my 'The Objectivity of Morality/ Philosophy 51 (1976) 5-20.
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Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
291
Oxfam, cannot but be true; it is a necessary truth. There could not
be a world identical with the actual world in all natural respects but
in which different moraljudgments were true (e.g., a world identical
with our world in all naturalrespects but in which murderand torture
were morallygood actions).No doubtparticularnecessarymoraltruths,
such as 'In circumstancesC you ought to fight for France'derive their
truthfrom more general moraltruths such as 'Everyoneought to fight
for his country when it is attackedby enemies who wish to rule over
it,' but my argument does not depend on such derivability.My only
point is that, if moraljudgments are true, and those which are contingently true are supervenient on naturalfacts, then the judgments that
they hold when those natural facts hold must be necessary. Hence
contingent moral truths derive their truth from contingent natural
truths and necessary moral truths. The basic moral truths are necessary truths.
We saw earlier that, if an inquirerwas to see how a greater good
defence worked with respect to some occurrentevil, he would have
to understandfive things. The conclusion which we have just reached
about the status of moral judgments shows us that these things boil
down to three necessarytruthsand two contingenttruths.The inquirer
needs to know that the evil E is such that there is a necessary moral
truth of the form 'It is not wrong for God to allow E to occur in circumstances Cv' and, second, he needs to know the contingent natural truth that Ca holds (unless, of course, Ca is 'all circumstances,'in
which case no second piece of knowledge is necessary). He needs to
know the necessary truth that to allow the occurrenceof E entails allowing a logically necessary condition of a state of affairs C2 at least
as good as the evil is bad. Fourth, he needs to know the necessary
truth that to allow the occurrenceof E (or an evil equally bad) is the
only morally permissible way of bringing about that logically necessary condition. And, fifth, he needs to know the contingent natural
truth that the good state of affairs C2 in fact occurs.
An inquirerneeds to know all these things with respect to the evils
of which he has knowledge if he is to see how a greatergood defence
works with respect to them. Often a theist cannot see how a greater
good defence works with respect to all the evils of which he knows.
And not merely so, but it seems often to a theist that there are many
evils for which it does not work. Forit seems to him often that for some
E the necessary moral truths of the kind described in my first, third
and fourth points above are such that, whatever the contingent natural circumstances,it would be incompatiblewith God's perfect goodness that he should allow E to occur; and it seems to him sometimes
that, although the necessary moral truths are such that it would be
compatiblewith God's perfectgoodness that he should allow E to occur
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Richard Swinburne
under certain contingent circumstances C (i.e., if both Ca and C2
occur), it is unlikely that these circumstancesoccur.
If the theist is in this position, then eitherit seems to him that there
is an evil E which is incompatiblewith the existence of God or it seems
to him that there is an evil E which together with not-C entails the
non-existence of God, and it seems to him on his evidence unlikely
that C obtains, and so unlikely that there is a God. So surely it is not
rationalfor him to believe that there is a God. Does he not need a theodicy, a justified account of how such evils do (contraryto appearances) serve a greater good, before he is justified in continuing to
believe?
II
The supreme principle which guides rationalbelief on all matters is
surely the principlewhich I have called elsewhere the Principleof Credulity:that, other things being equal, it is rationalto believe that things
are as they seem to be. By 'seem' (or 'appear')I mean 'seem epistemically'; the way things seem epistemically is the way we are initially
inclined to believe that they are. We find ourselves with involuntary
inclinationsto belief;in the absenceof reasonsagainstgoing along with
such an inclinationthe rationalman will do so. This must be the starting point for all knowledge; if all beliefs needed to be justifiedby other
beliefs before they could be believed with justification,no belief could
ever be justified.
However, we soon learn to distinguish kinds of belief, and to recognize limits in each kind to the applicationof the Principleof Credulity
because it seemsto us (epistemically)right to do so; applying the Principle enables us to see limits to its application.We come to distinguish
(perhaps merely in practice, or, if we are philosophers, in a careful
verbalizedway) between the realm of the logically necessary and the
realm of the logically contingent, and, within each group, between
propositions which claim our belief because they purportto represent
states of affairsof which we are immediately aware, and those which
claim our belief because they entail or are non-deductively supported
by propositions of the former type.
With respect to the purportedly necessary: if p seems to entail q,
or to be compatible, or to be incompatiblewith q, to be a necessary
truth, to be a contingent truth, or to be self-contradictory,we ought
so to believe - until counter-evidence can be produced. Counterevidence to an initial judgment of necessary truth, such as that p entails q, may be of various kinds. We may, for example, derive from
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293
many other cases of evident entailmentrules of deductive logic which
for many cases lay down when propositions entail each other. These
rules may have the consequence that p entails not-q. If it seems to us
more evident that the rules are correctand that this consequence follows from them, than that the initial judgment was correct, we must
abandon the initial judgment. The realm of the logically necessary
comes to us as a realmof things which could not be otherwise,to which
our mind has access by mere reflection.How things in this realmseem
positively (e.g., that p entails q) and how they seem negatively (e.g.,
that p does not entailq) would seem equallyto be entitledto our belief.
The logicallycontingentcould be otherwise. If, nevertheless,we take
how things seem to be as evidence of how they are, that can only be
because we believe that in general our inclinationsto belief are sensitive to the way things are. But there can only be this general sensitivity if there is a causal mechanism at work - either a direct causal
mechanism, whereby a state of affairs S causes me to believe that S
holds; or an indirectmechanismwhereby there is some state of affairs
R which causes my belief that S holds and also causes S. If I take how
things seem as evidence of how they are because I believe that there
is a direct causal mechanism at work, I purport to have a belief justified by experience - by perception or (if the belief is revived belief)
by memory. If I take how things seem as evidence of how they are
because I believe that there is an indirect causal mechanism at work,
we may say (for want of a better word) that I purport to have belief
justifiedby indirectperception. How things seem initiallyeither to be
necessary truths or to be contingent truths given to the subject by a
causal process I shall call his basic beliefs.
With apparentcontingenttruths, even more obviously than with apparent necessary truths, basic beliefs ought often to be abandoned
under the pressure of counter-evidence. It may seem initially to me
that there is an elephant in my back garden, but if everyone else tells
me it is not there, and if when I try to touch it my hand passes through
where it seems to be, I must abandon my belief.
Where basic beliefs are abandoned, they are abandoned under the
pressure of stronger beliefs with which the former seem to conflict.
These latter may be basic beliefs or, more likely, beliefs generated by
deduction or induction from many other basic beliefs. We move by
deductive inference to consequences buried within those beliefs. We
move by inductive inferencebeyond observationsto claims about the
future or distant past or the laws of nature. We do so in ways that
initiallyseem right to us. But through knowledge of how we infer and
others infer on other occasions, different inferentialsteps seem to us
the right ones from those which seemed so at first. Our genetically
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Richard Swinburne
inbuilt habits of inference become refined through practice. We may
even try to put into words the standardsof inductive inference which
we use, and through this process too we refine our practice;more consistent standards may seem the right ones. Beliefs formed by inductive inference from many apparent experiences then come to correct
the belief initially formed on the basis of experience.
Beliefs formed by inductive inference may come to correctnot just
particular'apparent seemings' but whole classes of them. Induction
teachesus that whole classes of apparentperceptions- of certainkinds
of thing by certain observers in certain circumstances - are unreliable. The latter is a consequence of our general knowledge of how the
world works, establishedby induction from a far wider class of apparent perceptions than those whose reliabilityis at stake.
How contingent things seem positively to be must be better justification for a claim about how they are than is how things seem negatively a justificationfor a claim about how they are not. 'It seems to
me that there is a table in the house' asserted as a reportof an inclination to believe on the basis of experience is better grounds for 'There
is a table in the house' than is 'It seems to me that there is no table
in the house' grounds for 'Thereis no table in the house.' This is because for the positive judgment to be reliable only one causal chain
needs to go from the object apparentlyperceived to the subject who
seems to perceiveit. Butif the negativejudgmentis to be reliable,causal
chains need to go from all places where the objectmight be to the subject who seems to perceive that the object is not present. Detailed investigationmay show which negativejudgmentsarejustifiablyasserted
on the basis of experience;but, even without it, the generalpoint about
the extent of causal chains needed for such judgments to be reliable
makes them much more shaky than positive judgments.2Detailedem-
2 I wrongly asserted in earlier writing The Existenceof God [Oxford: Clarendon Press
1979] 254f.) that negative seemings are no evidence at all of how things are; I
now correct that to an assertion that, as such (in advance of detailed empirical
evidence about them), negative 'seemings' on empirical matters give much shakier support to claims about how things are not that do positive 'seemings' to how
things are. It remains the case that 'It seems to me that there is a God' is much
better grounds for supposing that there is than 'It seems to me that there is no
God' is for supposing that there is no God (where both 'seemings' report apparent perceptions of things contingent). For if there is a God, one causal chain from
God to me would not be unexpected; but if there is no God, a bundle of causal
chains from all the places or states of affairs where there is no God to me is a
very dubious large-scale position.
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Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
295
piricalinvestigationwill refine this initialposition, showing how some
negative 'ssemings' are good evidence and others are not.
We learn, then, through practice, correctingour initial judgments
of how things seem to us, and, correctedby such procedures (which
seem to us the right ones to use), things seem to us differently. The
Principleof Credulityremainsthe basicmechanismfor passing beyond
our mental life to justified judgments about the necessary and contingent world outside, but we learn through practicehow to correctits
judgments.
It follows from this general accountof rationalbelief that, if it seems
to the theist that there is an evil E incompatiblewith the existence of
God, he ought so to believe, and so to believe that there is no God.
If it seems to him that there is an evil E which, together with not-C,
entails the non-existence of God, and it seems to him likely that notC, and so unlikely that there is a God, he ought so to believe. And,
since believing p unlikely entails believing not-p more likely that p,
it entails believing that not-p. The theist in that situation ought to believe that there is no God. All this - unless he has evidence which
seems to him to tell against that conclusion. The onus of proof has
passed to the theist; he needs reason for resisting the conclusion.
Ill
The reason may be of three kinds. It may consist of other reasons for
affirmingthat there is a God; or generalreasons for doubtingthe force
of this sort of inferenceto his non-existence;or reasons for supposing
that a greatergood defence works in respectof the particularevil which
seemed initially to show the non-existence of God, in other words,
a theodicy.
Let us begin with the first reason. Any argumentfor denying a true
conclusion must be unsound; and if it seems to a subject strongly
enough (as a necessary truth or a deliveranceof experience)that some
propositionis true, then any inference to its falsity must be unsound.
If it seems to a subjectstrongly enough that there is an externalworld
or that 2+2=4, powerfulphilosophicalargumentsto the contrarymust
be judged by the subjectto be unsound, even if he cannot put his finger on where they go wrong. Likewise, if it seems to a subject strongly enough (as a basic belief, delivered either by experience or reason)
that there is a God, then he is entitled to the belief, whatever else he
is initiallyinclined to believe. A purportedlydeductive inferencefrom
E to the non-existence of God must start from a false premiss or be
invalid. The inductve inferencevia non-C may be justified,but its con-
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elusion (however likely it is rendered by E) must be regarded by the
believer as false. So much is, I hope, undeniable.
But the basic belief will have to be overwhelmingly powerful if it is
not to be overcome by an apparentlysimple deductive inference, relying on apparentlyincontrovertiblemoral principles, from a very evident evil. The less sure the thinker is about his moral principles, the
less strong does the basic belief need to be. Again, the less confident
is the thinkerabout the inferentialprinciplesinvolved in his inference
via non-C, the less strong does the basic belief in the existence of God
need to be in order to overcome it. Also, in this case, the conclusion
of the inductive inference is only that it is likely that not-C. But if it
seems to the subject that it is very likely that there is a God, again on
balance the evidence against C is outweighed.
Even if the belief that there is a God is not a basic belief, as long
as it seems to the subject to be supported by evident basic beliefs on
the basis of evidently sound inferential principles, it may be strong
enough for the subject rationally not to abandon it in the light of
counter-argument.Again, it will depend on how evident are the moral
and inferentialprinciples involved in the counter-argumentand how
likely it seems to the subjectthat they make any state of affairsincompatible, given a certain evil, with the existence of God.
Apartfrompositive evidence for the negationof the conclusion,there
may be reason for doubting that the principles of inference, and so
that any purportedlynecessary truths involved in any argumentfrom
evil, are as sound as initiallythey seem to be. In particular,some moral
principlefrom which it follows that the existence of God is incompatible with the occurrenceof a certain evil may seem initially evident.
But we derive our moral principlesfrom reflectionon particularcases
of how humans behave towards each other, judging one kind of behaviour good and another kind wrong, and then apply them to judging what would be good or wrong for God to do. The God whose
existence is at stake will, if he exists, be very different in nature from
ourselves, and so have kinds of good and evil open to him of which
we cannotdream,and understandthe worth of actions(especiallythose
open to him alone) with a depth which we cannot. As humans grow
up and become more sensitive to the natureand consequences of their
actions, they often come to see many kinds of action as good which
previously they regarded as bad: e.g., discipline, loyalty, patience,
courage and tolerance. But our experience and our reflectionupon it
are still so limited that it would not be surprisingif we had yet more
to learn about the nature and consequences of actions which would
lead to our revising further our judgments about their moral quality.
Our extrapolationsfrom human situations to what would be good or
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Does Theism Need a Theodiq/?
297
evil conduct for a God must be particularlyshaky. Hence, if there is
a God, we would expect to find some evils which, it seems to us initially, he could not allow to occur, compatiblywith his perfect goodness. Theismis in this respect similarto a hypothesis H that some very
clever criminaldid the crime;if H is true, one will expect to find some
evidence apparentlysuggesting (i.e., evidence which would suggest
in the absence of other evidence) that H is false (because that criminal, unlike others, would have planted misleading clues).
Although this is so, it remains the case that - barringa consideration to be discussed below - we are only justified in believing that
our judgment, that a particularevil is incompatiblewith the existence
of God, is erroneousbecausethe resultof inadequatemoralexperience,
if on balance all the evidence (including the evidence from evil) suggests that there is a God. If it does, then it makes plausible the view
that certain evils are really justified by a 'greatergood defence/ and
only seem to count against the existence of God because of the distance in moral understandingbetween ourselves and God. The point
about the likely inadequacyof our moral understanding has the consequence that, if the balance tilts Godwards, it tilts more decisively
Godwards than it would otherwise do. But otherwise - barringthe
considerationbelow - we have no reason to suppose that if our inadequatemoralunderstandingof what a God would do were improved
we should come to see the presently puzzling evils as such as God
would permit;the improvementin our understandingmight as easily
lead us to see existing states of affairswhich we now think of as ones
which God would allow as ones which God would not permit. Only
if on balance we already have reason to believe that there is a God,
do we have reason to suppose that the deficiency of our moral understanding concerns and concerns alone those puzzling evils which
would otherwise count against the existence of God.
There is a furtherconsiderationwhich, if it held, would reasonably
lead us to suppose that improvement in our moral understanding
would be in the directionof seeing all present puzzling evils as really
such as God would permit. This is that when initiallyit seemed to an
inquirerthat many kinds of evil were incompatiblewith the existence
of God (straightforwardly,or given furthercontingent naturaltruths
which seemed to the inquirerto be highly likely), subsequent reflection, argument, and experience led him to see, one by one, with respect to a numberof such kinds of evil, with apparentclarity,that they
were not incompatible with the existence of God; a greater good
defence apparentlyworked in respect of them: but the reverse did not
happen - the inquirerdid not come to see states of affairswhich he
regarded initially as good as apparently incompatiblewith the exis-
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tence of God. In Lakatos'terminology,3the theisticresearchprogramme
would have proved progressive. That gives grounds to the inquirer
to suppose that eventually he will apparentlysee that all kinds of occurrent evil are justified in terms of a greater good defence.
Whether a given inquirerhas this kind of evidence of finding more
and more evils explicablein terms of a greatergood defence is an empiricalmatter.Certainlysome inquirershave a recordof such progressive understanding;and an inquirerwith such a recordmust rationally
be much more doubtfulaboutthe moralprinciplesinvolved in his judging the remainingpuzzling evils to be incompatiblewith the existence
of God than he would otherwise be. Depending on the strength of
his initial conviction, this evidence of his past recordmay tip the balance in favour of God.
I conclude that it follows from the Principleof Credulitythat apparent evils must count against the existence of God, but, even in the absence of a greater good defence in respect of each such evil, other
considerations may still outweigh the force of apparent evil, so that
on balance it remains rational to believe that there is a God.
The provision of a greatergood defence with respect to a given kind
of evil is the provision for that evil of a theodicy, in the sense of a reason why (compatiblywith his perfect goodness) God could allow that
evil to occur.Barringpoints made above, the theist needs for each kind
of evil which seems to him to count againstthe existenceof God a theodicy in this sense; he does not need a theodicy in the sense of God's
actual reasons for allowing some evil to occur.
We have seen that, barringvery strong evidence of the existence of
God, an inquirerdoes at any rateneed a theodicy with respect to some
of the evils in the world which seem to him to count against the existence of God, which would lead him to suppose that a theodicy is to
be had with respect to other evils. And even that evidence of increasing success of theodicy might be quite insufficientto defuse the power
of apparentevil in the absenceof a full theodicy, a theodicyfor all kinds
of evil.
IV
the view that the theist does not need a theodicy of this kind in order
rationallyto believe that there is a God has recently been put forward
3 I. Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'
in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrove, eds., Criticismand the Growth of Knowledge(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970)
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by Stephen Wykstra4in an interesting article,which seems to suggest
that apparentevils do not count at all against theism, independently
of whether the balance of evidence actually supports theism or not.
Wykstrawrites in criticismof Rowe, who uses in effect the principle
which I have calledthe Principleof Credulity.Wykstrais unhappy with
the qualificationwhich I originally put on the principle, to the effect
that, while how things seem positively is evidence of how they are,
how things seem negatively is not. (I have modified this qualification
extensively in the present paper.) He suggests instead an alternative
qualificationwhich, he claims, is sensitive to the intuitions lying behind my original qualification.
Wykstraplaces his alternativequalificationnot on the inferencefrom
'seems' to 'is' but on which assertions of 'seems' are justified. Wykstra
calls his limiting principle CORNEA of 'Condition of Reasonable
Epistemic Access':
On the basis of cognized situation S, human H is entitled to claim "It appears
that p" only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties
and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, S would likely be different
than it is in some way discernible by her. (85)
Thatis, we can only justifiablyassert 'Itappearsthat p' if we have reason to believe that, if not-p, the observed situation would be different
in respect of those features which lead us to assert 'It appears that p.'
Wykstrathen uses this principle to claim that we cannot claim that
'it appearsthat there are evils which serve no God-justifyingpurpose/
i.e., 'it appearsthat there are evils such that God would not allow them
to occur.' He claims that we cannot make this claim because, if there
were no evils such that God would not allow them to occur, we would
be unlikelyto recognizethis fact;our moralbeliefs being so much shallower than those of God, we are bound to think some states of affairs
to be evils serving no greater good, although in fact they do serve a
greater good.
Wykstra'sCORNEAreminds the readerof a similarconditionin Nozick's account of knowledge.5 It is one of Nozick's conditions for S
knows that p that 'if not-p, S would not believe p.' But Nozick is careful to point out that 'ifnot-p'concernswhat would happen in the closest
4 Stephen J. Wykstra, 'The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of "Appearance/" InternationalJournalfor the Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984) 73-93
5 R. Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanations(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981), chapter 3.
See especially p.172 and p.199.
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worlds in which p is false. It is for that reason that I do know that I
am readinga book; even if, were I not reading a book and were a brain
in a vat subjectto certainstimuli, I would stillbelieve that I was reading
a book;the point is that, if I was not readinga book and otherwisethings
were much the same as at present, I would not believe that I was reading a book, and that (in part)is why I know that I am reading a book.
Analogously, if CORNEAis to plausible, 'if there were no evils such
that God would not allow them to occur'is presumablyto be read as
'in the closest possible world to ours in which there were no evils such
that God would not allow them to occur/ viz., if things were different
solely in the respect that there were no such evils and, as far as logically possible, otherwise the same. But, that being so, Wykstrais not
entitled to claim that, if this was the case, we would not recognize it.
For, if the evils were removed from our world which are such that,
if there is a God, he would not permitthem, that would of course make
no difference if there is in fact a God. But if such evils are removed
and there is no God, then this could be expected to make a difference
which we would recognize. For there is no reason to suppose that in
that case our moral beliefs would be badly deficient in just the kind
of way that would lead us to think that there are evils which do not
serve a greater good, when in fact all the evils in the world do serve
a greatergood. As I wrote earlier, our moral beliefs are just as likely
to be at fault in another direction - leading us not to recognize many
other evils around us which do not serve a greatergood, while being
on the rightlines with respect to our judgments that certainevils serve
no greatergood. WhetherWykstra'sclaimthat we wouldn't recognize
a differenceif ther were no 'evils which serve no God-justifyingpurpose' depends on whether our world, and so the closest possible world
to ours, contains God. In other words, Wykstrahas begged the question. He does so in a way which, when brought to light, reinforces
my earlierpoint that whether the Principleof Credulityought to lead
us from evils apparentlycounting against the existence of God to the
non-existence of God depends crucially on the extent of our other
grounds for believing that there is a God. Only to the extent to which
he has grounds for believing that there is a God does he have grounds
for supposing that we would not notice any difference made by the
removal of 'evils which serve no God-justifyingpurpose,' and so for
using CORNEAto defuse the force of an argumentfrom apparentevil
against the existence of God.
V
In analysing what the rationalinquirerwill come to believe as a result
of it seeming to him that there exist evils which serve no greatergood,
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I was in effectconcernedwith how an inquirermay securewhat I called
in Faithand Reasonrational}belief.6 A belief is rational} in so far as
(roughly) it fits with and is supported by the subject's other beliefs,
by his own standards. A subject's belief that there is a God will be
irrational if there are evils apparently (by his own moral principles)
incompatiblewith the existence of God, or incompatiblegiven some
contingent naturalcircumstanceswhich, by his own standards, very
likely exist, unless there is very strong evidence of or supported by
basic beliefs, that there is a God.
Those concerned for truth will seek to conform their beliefs to how
things are, and that minimallyinvolves ensuringthat they believe only
those propositionswhich are likely to be true by standardswhich seem
to them correct.However, the enquirermust go on to seek more than
rationality2-He must seek to believe only those things which are likely
to be true, given true standards for assessing the evidence; and his
beliefs will be rational2in so far as he does so believe. An inquirer's
beliefs are rational2if those are the beliefs which would be reached
by an inquirerpossessed of the same empiricalevidence as himself,
and having and ableto apply correctlyall correctprinciplesof inference.
We distinguish what follows deductively from a premiss from what
seems to some individual at some time to followfrom the premiss. If
there are correct principles of inference of a non-deductive kind, as
we all assume when doing science or history, we can make the same
distinction with respect to a far wider class of inferences. Evidence e
does in fact 'support'h ('renderh probable,'or however we describe
the relationof non-deductivejustification),if a being who applied correctly those correctprinciples of inference would be able to draw out
h from e. Since adding necessary truths to premisses adds nothing to
what follows from them, a being who can draw any correct conclusion from e can draw any correct conclusion from e conjoined with
any necessary truth, including that truth itself. So he would in effect
be in possession of all necessary truths (and given the results of an
earlier section, that includes the necessary moral truths); so that an
agent'sbeliefs are rational2if they are in fact supportedby his evidence
(whetheror not he realizesthat they are). He, of course, can only guide
his conduct by beliefs which seem to him to be supported by the evidence, but he will seek to make his beliefs rational}, and thence
rational2.
Now the existence or non-existence of God is an all-importantmatter, and the view formedby an initialjudgment must be examinedfur-
6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981), chapter 2
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ther. We must seek to acquirenew contingentevidence (i.e., new basic
beliefs about how things seem contingently to us) and we must test
our moralprinciples, and principlesof deductive and inductive inference, through experience, reading, and reflection. In so far as we fail
to give enough time to doing this with respect to so importanta matter, our resulting belief will fail to be what I called in FaithandReason
rational3,rational4,or rational5.A belief is rational3so long as it results
from an investigationwhich the inquirerhimself consideredto be sufficiently lengthy and serious; a belief is rational4so long as it results
from an investigationwhich by the inquirer'sown standardswas sufficiently long and serious - whether or not he formed that view about
it; a belief is rational5as long as it results from an investigation which
by true objective standards was sufficiently long and serious.
But, although proper investigation is of great importance, at any
given time an inquirer'srationalityconsists in holding such beliefs as
are supported by evidence; and that is a matter of rationality! and
rationality2.As I wrote, my earlier discussion was concerned with
rationalitya. But inquirerswho seek true beliefs will, for that purpose,
seek not merelyrational!beliefs but, further,rational2beliefs;will seek
to have beliefs which are in an objectivesense supported by their empiricalevidence. If in fact, given contingentempiricalfacts k, some evil
e could serve no greatergood, then (given necessary moral truths) (e
and k) entails the falsity of h, the hypothesis that there is a God. On
evidence (e and k), the belief that not-h will be rational2.If, given contingent empiricalfacts k, some evil e could serve a greatergood only
if / certainother naturalcontingent states, holds, if (e and k) make it
unlikely that f, then they make it unlikely that h. Again, on evidence
(e and k), the belief that not-h will be rational2.(In this case, however, unlike the formercase, [e and k] may hold and h still be true, even
if it is rational2to believe otherwise.) Rationality!depends on the subject's estimate of rationality2.A subject'sbeliefs are rational!in so far
as by his best estimate (by his own standards, or a weighted average
of various standards, in so far as he is uncertainabout them, weighted by the degree of his confidence in each) they are supported by the
evidence.
It is most unfortunatethat various writers who concern themselves
with the rationalityof religious belief do not distinguish between the
different kinds of rationality;and some of the disagreements about
when religious belief is 'rational'clearly arise from this source. However, most writers who write about the kinds of matter discussed in
previous sections are most plausibly interpreted as being concerned
with 'rationality!';they are concernedwith whether an inquirer'sbeliefsystem is internally coherent.
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303
VI
Is the way evidence functions here adequatelycapturedby the probabilitycalculus,and in particularby Bayes'theorem, which follows from
the axioms of the calculus? I believe that it is, on the logical theory
of probability,in the sense that the objective'support'or making 'likely' given by evidence to hypothesis obeys the axioms of 'probability';
and so, that a subject'sbelief is rational2in so far as it is rendered'probable' by evidence, by a probabilitywhich obeys those axioms.
The logicaltheoryof probabilityis concernedwith the extentto which
one proposition(or conjunctionor disjunctionof propositions)renders
probableanotherproposition (or conjunctionor disjunctionof propositions). Otheraccountsof 'probability'are not basicallyconcernedwith
evidential support. The personalist or subjective theory is concerned
with measuresof individualbelief, the propensitytheorywith a 'wouldbe' in nature, and the statisticalor frequency theory with proportions
of objects possessing one property among objects possessing another. 'Probabilities'in the senses analysed by one or other of these theories may be used as our evidence or hypothesis when we are
concernedto assess the extent of evidentialsupport for some evidence
or hypothesis, but for them 'probability'is not the relation of evidential support. Since our concern is with the evidential support provided by certainevidence for the hypothesis of the existence of God, our
concern is with 'probability'as analysed by logical theory, with functions of the type P(p/q) measuring how probable evidence q makes
hypothesis p. P(p/q) = 1 means that, given q, p cannot but be true.
P(p/q) = 0 means that, given q, p cannot but be false. Probabilitylies
between 1 and 0.
Bayes' theorem, put in these terms, may be expressed as follows:
p(h/e.k) = ^^xP(h/k)
P(e/k).
h is the hypothesis up for investigation, e is the evidence of observation, k is background knowledge. Our evidence may be distributed
as we choose between e and k; k may represent mere tautological
knowledge or, alternatively,some detailedcontingentempiricalknowledge. P(h/k) is the prior probabilityof h, how likely h was to be true,
before we acquirednew evidence e, on backgroundknowledge alone.
P(h/e.k) is the posterior probabilityof h, how likely h is to be true in
the light of evidence e(as well as backgroundknowledge). P(e/h.k) is
the 'predictivepower of h, how likely, if h is true (and k also), it is
that e will occur. P(e/k) is the prior probabilityof e, how likely it is
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Richard Swinburne
that e will occur, if we do not assume that h is true (but only assume
k). The value of P(e/k) is the sum of the probabilitiesof the different
routes by which e could occur; viz., P(e/k) = P(e/h.k) P(h/k) +
P(e/ha.k)P(ha/k) + P(e/h2.k)P(h2/k)... and so on, where h,hlr h2, etc.
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. P(e/h.k) / P(e/k)
is the 'explanatorypower' of h, how much more likely e is to occur
if h is true than it would be if this is not assumed. It will be seen that
the lower the prior probabilitiesof the alternativesto h (viz., hy h2,
etc.) and the lower their predictive power, the greaterwill be the explanatory power of h.
I have argued in many places7that Bayes'Theoremis true in the following sense. If we can give exact numericalvalues to the component
probabilities,the theorem states truly the numericalrelationsbetween
these. In so far as values can be ascribedto components only within
a range (e.g., that P(e/h.k) is greater than 0 but less than P(e/k)), it
is possible to find arbitraryvalues within those ranges under which
the theorem states correctnumericalrelations. Hence all principlesof
comparativeprobabilitywhich are entailedby Bayes'Theoremaretrue,
e.g., P(h/e.k) > P(h/k) iff P(e/h.k) > P(e/k). T(h/e.k)' is to be read
as 'e confirms h,' that is, increases its probability above its prior
probability.
Crucialfor the applicationof Bayes'Theorem, especially in the context of assessing theism, is the assessment of the prior probabilityof
hypotheses on tautologicalbackgroundevidence, which I call their intrinsicprobability.Although P(h/k), where k is (p v ~p) measuresthis,
we are unlikely to get any feel for its value, comparativelyor absolutely, by asking ourselves what we would say about how likely h would
be, if we knew nothing except a truth of logic. Rather,the way to go
about finding what determines this value is to consider how we assess the posterior probabilitiesof competing hypotheses, relative to
each other, when those two hypotheses have equal predictivepower
with respect to a body of evidence e, and there is nothing in our empiricalbackgroundknowledge to favour one such hypothesis above
another. Considering such situations, we may see that there are two
factors which give a value to intrinsic probability,in so far as it has
a value. One is content, the other is simplicity. The more content a
7 What follows is the briefest of summaries of a position for which I have argued
at length elsewhere. See especially my The Existenceof God (Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1979) in particular chapter 3, and An Introductionto ConfirmationTheory(London: Methuen 1973). This summary is, however, necessary in order to defend
the view that the existence of apparent evil affects the probability of the existence
of God.
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305
hypothesishas (the more detailedand wide rangingits claims),as such,
the lower its intrinsicprobability.The simplera hypothesis - the fewer
entities, fewer kinds of entities, mathematicallysimpler modes of behaviour, it postulates - as such, the greater its intrinsic probability.
These two factors combine together to determine the intrinsicprobability of a hypothesis. Content, however, becomes of less importance
when we are dealing with all-embracingtheories. The great strength
of Newton's theory of gravitation, apart from its explanatorypower
with respect to a vast range of phenomena, lay in its simplicity - in
particularthe mathematicalsimplicity of its three laws of motion and
its law of gravitationalattraction.I must make clear, as I did not in
earlierwriting, that the 'simplicity'of a proposition h in my sense is
a matterof the simplicityin a more normalsense of the simplestproposition logically equivalent to h. (For example, conjoining to h a complicated necessary truth makes a proposition no less simple, and so
no less likelyto be true, than the originalh.) By the 'content'of a proposition I understand 'empiricalcontent'; a proposition has greatercontent, the fewer the possible worlds in which it is true.
In The ProbabilisticArgumentfrom Evil,'8Alvin Plantingacriticized
the view that the occurrenceof evil makes improbablethe existence
of God - as 'probability'is understood by logical theory; and, more
generally, the view that the probabilitycalculus, interpretedby logical theory, was of any use for assessing the probabilityof any hypothesis. His criticisms of my views contained therein were due to two
misunderstandings,one his fault and one mine. He erroneously supposed that I held that simplicitywas the sole determinantof intrinsic
probability,and produced knock-down arguments against that view
and against a rivalview that content was the sole determinant.These
arguments work, but neither of the views advocated was mine, and
my view was stated explicitlyin my writing. Plantinga'ssecond criticism was well to the point. He selected pairs of propositions, logically
equivalent(and thus of equal content) yet greatly differingin 'simplicity/ and pointed out that it was an axiom of the calculus that logically
equivalent propositions always have the same probability.I ought to
have said, but did not say (because I did not adequately appreciate),
that the 'simplicity'of a proposition h in my sense was to be taken
as the simplicity in a more normal sense of the simplest proposition
logically equivalent to it. It is a matter of the simplicity of the world,
whose existence it entails.
8 Philosophical Studies 35 (1979) 1-53
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These points sufficeto renderharmlessthe purportedlyknock-down
arguments contained in Plantinga'spaper. His other arguments concern the difficulty of how we are to go about attributingto propositions intrinsic probabilities.9My claim was, however, only that the
principles stated above often yield comparativeintrinsicprobabilities
(e.g., show that P^/k) > P(h2/k)or P(ha/k) < 1 or P(h1/k) = 1/2);
and that when they do so, we can always then arbitrarilyattributenumericalprobabilitiesin such a way as to conform to Bayes' Theorem
and, more generally, to the axioms of the calculus.
9 One such difficulty arises where we have an infinite number of exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses; in many such cases, Plantinga suggests (see his pp. 25-30),
it would be intuitively plausible to ascribe equal intrinsic probability to each, but
then given the usual spelling out of the axioms of the calculus, the prior probability of each member of such a set will be 0. If the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is 0, its posterior probability on any evidence will also be 0, and no such
hypothesis can be confirmed by evidence. Plantinga suggests that any set of the
form: HQ,'there are no A's'; Hv 'there is just 1 A'; H2 'there are just 2 A's' ...
and so on, conforms to this pattern. For there is, he claims, nothing to choose
between such hypotheses on grounds of content or simplicity. They all have equal
content and are equally simple, he suggests; and he gives an example of such
a set when 'A' = 'horse/
Plantinga's example is a bizarre one. The hypotheses between which we seek
to make a judgment in science, history or other fields of inquiry, have a fuller
explicit structure which makes their relative simplicity easier to assess. But if we
do take his hypotheses by themselves we find when we look at them more closely that they are committed to more than their form explicitly reveals. Ho is quite
different from the others; the postulation of nothing is always simpler than the
postulation of something. As regards the others - their explicit claims concern
only horses. But (of logical necessity) horses cannot exist on their own. To be
a horse, something has to take in food and air, and get rid of waste products.
Plausibly too, it has to have a relatively short finite life. The various hypotheses
H|, H2 . . . are committed to (and so implicitly postulate) whatever else is necessary for them to be true (e.g., H2 is committed to the existence of food and air
for two horses, some causal mechanism which caused the existence of two horses,
any other horses which were caused to exist having been eliminated). The simplicity of a proposition is a matter of the simplicity of the world whose existence
it entails, and the relative simplicity of the hypotheses about horses turns on the
relative simplicity of the further biological assumptions which would need to hold
if the theory is to be true. That being so, I suggest that a simpler story can be
told of how there comes to be a horse population of modest size on one planet,
than of how there comes to be a solitary horse somewhere in the universe, or
of how there comes to be a universe swarming with horses (e.g., by means of
qualitatively identical horse-generating mechanisms on each of many distant
planets). When we give some filling to such bizarre examples, judgments of relative simplicity become plausible, which do not yield Plantinga's negative
conclusions.
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So Plantinga'sarguments do not succeed in showing that we cannot assess the probabilityof large scale theories on evidence, in accordance with the axioms of the probabilitycalculus, as spelled out by
logical theory, using the criteriaof content and simplicity for assessing intrinsicprobability.Thatbeing said, it will be seen that the probabilitycalculus captures more formallyour intuitive judgments about
the evidential force in an objectivesense for the hypothesis of theism
of the existence of evils which seem to serve no greater good. Some
of these latter,as we have seen, we judge to be such as to serve a higher
good only if there are entities and processes in the world other than
those observable(e.g., humans have free will, or there is an after-life).
Let us suppose that we are right in this judgment. Then let e be the
evidence of the existence of these evils, k our other evidence about
the world, and h the hypothesis of theism. Let f be such entities and
processes as we need to postulate if God is to be justified in allowing
e. Then whether e disconfirms h, or is irrelevantto h, or even confirmsh depends on variouspossible relationswhich may hold between
h, e, f, and k. One theoreticalpossibility is that h may entail f, and
f entail e: viz. in virtue of his perfectgoodness God has to bring about
an f which includes e. In that case e will always confirmh (the occurrence ofevils will be positive evidence for the existence of God). For
P(e/h.k) = l and so P(e/h.k)> P(e/k). Hence P(h/e.k) > P(h/k). However I cannot think of any plausible filling for f which would satisfy
this pattern. A second possibility is that while h entails f, f does not
entail e. Then e will confirm h if P(e/h.f.k) > P(e/k), disconfirm if
P(e/h.f.k) < P(e/k),and be irrelevantif these two probabilitiesareequal.
ForP(h.f/e.k) = P(h/e.k) (since if e, f is a necessary condition of h) and
P(h.f/k) = P(h/k); and so P(h/e.k) > P(h/k) iff P(h.f/e.k) > P(h.f/k)
which will be so iff P(e/h.f .k) > P(e/k). If one supposed that God in
virtueof his perfectgoodness would have to createsome creatureswith
libertarianfree will to choose between good and evil (f) then this second possibility would apply for e as moral evil. Since it is very probable that such creatureswill sometimes bring about moral evil, for this
filling e confirmsh. I do not myself think that God would have to create such creatures;there is good in his doing so and good in his not
doing so, and comparisonbetween the two goods seems difficult. A
third possibility is that while f entails e, h does not entail f . God in
virtue of his perfect goodness does not have to bring about the necessarycondition(f) of his allowinge to occur,but if he does e must occur.
In this case P(e/h.f.k) = land so > P(e/k). Hence P(h.f/e.k) > P(h.f/k).
P(h.f/e.k) = P(h/e.k). P(h.f/k) < P(h/k), because (h.f) has greatercontent than h (since h does not entail f)- Whether e confirms or disconfirmsturns on whether P(h.f/e.k) exceeds P(h.f/k)by a greateramount
than P(h/k) exceeds P(h.f/k). I cannot think of plausible examples of
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this third possibility. Almost all plausible fillings for f and e are of a
fourth pattern, where h does not entail f, nor does f entail e. There
is some state of affairs(e.g. libertarianfree will) which God does not
have to bring about but may well choose to, such that if it occurs then
it is quite probable(butnot certain)that the e (e.g. moralevil) will occur
(the occurrenceof f being a necessary condition of God allowing e to
occur).In that case P(h.f/e.k) = P(h/e.k), and P(h.f/k) < P(h/k)for reasons given previously.Then P(h/e.k)will exceedP(h/k)only if P(h.f/e.k)
exceeds P(h.f/k)by a greateramount than P(h/k)exceeds P(h.f/k). This
will depend on how probableit is that, whether or not there is a God,
e will occur; how probable it is that if there is a God, he will bring
about f; and how probableit is that f will lead to e. Loosely, one may
say that e will confirmh only if it is very probablethat God will bring
about f and very probablethat f will lead to e, and not very probable
that e will occur if there is no God. Otherwise e will be irrelevantor
disconfirmatory.The probabilitycalculus cannot give us exact values
here, but it can bring cruciallyto the surface exactly what is at stake.
And what is at stake is how unlikely the evils are to occur if there is
no God, and how special and peculiar an f we need to postulate in
order to save the hypothesis of theism.
Otherevils e we judge to be such as could serve no highergood whatever else (other than k, the rest of our knowledge about the world)
might be the case. If we are right in this judgement about them, these
evils will not merely disconfirmh, the hypothesis of theism, but will
conclusivelyfalsifyit. Forsuch evils P(e/h.k) = 0, and so P(h/e.k) = 0.10
The probabilitycalculus will only yield the right answers about the
extent of evidential support for a hypothesis, P(h/e.k), given the right
values of the othervariableson which it is dependent. In so faras there
is doubt about these values, e.g., doubt about whether P(e/h.k) = 0
arising from doubt about the moral principles used to reach this conclusion, there will be doubt about the evidential support for, i.e., the
objective probabilityof, h. In this situation the inquirermust utilize
his own standards in reaching a judgment about that value (or, if he
is uncertainabout his own standards, make an average of its possible
values on differentmoral and logical principles, each weighted by the
10 My concern in TheExistenceof Godwas to show that the existence of God was
probable(in the objective sense) on generally accessibleevidence, and so that
a belief that there is a God was on that evidence rational2.I argued that there
were no evils which could serve no higher good, nor even evils which made it
improbablethat there was a God or even lowered that probabilityfrom what it
was on other evidence.
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Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
309
strength of his belief that those are the correctprinciples). His belief
that h will be rational iff that value exceeds 1/2.
We may now restate, in the light of this general understanding of
how rationalitya is related to the probabilitycalculus, our earlier account of how a rational belief is to be formed if it seems to us initially that there are evils in the world incompatiblewith the existence of
God. If it also seems to us strongly that we have evidence k which
entails h, then we are right to conclude that P(h/k) = 1, and so for
any e P(h/e.k) = 1, and so any moralprincipleswhich have the consequence that P(e/h.k) = 0 must be mistaken. Conversely, if we are certain of our moralprinciples, and have evidence e, such that it appears
to us very strongly that h entails not-e, P(e/h) = 0 and so P(e/h.k) =
0, we must judge that P(h/e.k) = 0, however high (unless k entails
h) is P(h/k). The higher is P(h/k), however, the less probable (objectively) it is that an e will be found such that P(e/h.k) = 0; and so, in
so faras we have reasonfor believingthatP(h/k)is high, we have every
reason for looking at such purported e very carefully, and reflecting
on the principles involved. Scientists look with great scepticism at a
few purported falsifying experiments of a theory which is otherwise
very successful. They rightly suspect a misobservationor a miscalculation. Newton's vastly sucessful theory of gravitationlived for many
years quite happily with the fact that it appeared to predict a movement of the moon's apse far slower than that observed; the observation seemed to falsify the theory. After sixty years it was shown to be
a miscalculation;what was observed was in fact what was predicted
by the theory. Rationalityin religiondemands a similarattitude.A solitary counter-instanceor kind of counter-instanceis rightly not taken
seriously; there must be a mistake somewhere. But if P(h/k) is apparently none too high, e is well observed (and the more separateobservations there are of e, the more certain it is that something of this
characterhas occurred),and reflectionon the logicalprinciples(including moralprinciples)involved apparentlyshows that P(e/h.k) = 0, then
the rational man must judge that almost certainly P(h/e.k) = 0.
The only reason for not so arguing with respect to some evil apparently incompatiblewith the existence of God, I claimed earlier, was
if theodicy proved to have a good trackrecordin making evils at first
sight apparentlyinconsistent with the existence of God not to appear
so subsequently. I now put this point in terms of the calculus. Let e
be the evil apparentlyincompatiblewith h, the hypothesis of theism,
g this recordof the past success of theodicy and k the rest of our knowledge. The value of P(e/h.k) is a necessarytruthand cannot be changed
by g; rather,g suggests that its true value is not 0. Let j = 'Whileretaiing our general rationality,and our basic moral concepts (and applying them to normalcases roughly as before), it will through reflection
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310
Richard Swinburne
come to seem to us stronglythat P(e/h.k) * 0/ Then P(j/e.g.k) is much
higher than P(j/e.k) and may come to exceed 1/2 (the record of past
performancebeing so impressive despite it initiallyseeming to us that
the evil e serves no higher good and so makes it likely that continuing
to be generally rational, we shall recognize this fact). If we have reason to believe that sincere reflection on moral principles will lead us
to a position where it will seem to us, retainingour generalrationality1
and all our present evidence and applicationof our principles to normal cases, that P(e/h.k) =£0, we ought to believe that that is so. This
is a principle for rational1belief, an extension of the Principleof Credulity. It says that how things will appear to us, when we have built
upon our earlierreflectionon them (in ways which have given results
which appear to us to be correctin other cases) is how we ought to
believe that they are. This principle can easily be seen to be correct
from a less controversialexample. Suppose that a student discovers
a book of purporteddeductiveproofsof some twenty theoremsof some
calculus(e.g. geometry). The principlesof the science, the axioms and
rules of inference are explained in the introduction.The first ten theorems seem to follow from the axioms, but the subsequent theorems
seem not to follow. However, the student works at the 'proofs/ and
eventually it seems to him clearthat Theorem11 does follow from the
axioms;the proof given turns out to have been rathercondensed. Still,
the student can't see how the remainingnine follow; in each case the
affirmationof the premisses and denial of the conclusion seem to him
consistent. However, he works away and eventually it seems to him
clearthat the proofs of Theorem12, Theorem13, Theorem14 and Theorem 15 work. Surely this gradual accumulationof results is grounds
for supposing that the remaining proofs also work. It is so because
it providesgroundsfor supposing that if the student were to work hard
enough at the remaining proofs, he would come to believe (while retaining his general rationality,and building on his previous achievements) that they work. And the belief that he will come to see
something while retaining his general rationalityand his application
of principles to clear cases is grounds for how things will appear to
him when he sees more deeply, and so grounds for believingtrue what
otherwise seems false.
VII
So, yes, in general theism does need a theodicy. A theist needs to discover, with respect to each evil which seems not to make possible any
greatergood, how it does make possible a greatergood. Or, in default
of that, he needs good grounds from the past success of theodicy in
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Does Theism Need a Theodicy?
311
apparentlymakingclearto him the point of other evils, for supposing
that he could eventually find a theodicy for each evil. Otherwise, evil
will count against the existence of God. And if it seems to the theist
stronglyon moralgrounds that (whateverthe other contingentcircumstances) present evils serve no higher good, or that factual evidence
is againstthe existenceof the entities and processeswhich alone would
make present evils serve higher goods, then the theist's counterevidence (in the form of a basic belief that there is a God, or a nonbasicbelief apparentlyrenderedprobableby evidence) will need to be
stronger, if he is to be justified in retaining his theistic beliefs. Howver, for myself, I believe that the requiredtheodicy can be provided.
ReceivedNovember, 1986
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