G.R. No. L-12172
August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts:
Respondents are charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a
building without a permit from the mayor. Fajardo et. al. applied for a permit to the
mayor but the latter denied the request on the ground that constructing a building in said
lot “hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to (the) public plaza”.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking is a valid exercise of eminent domain in its regulation
of property.
Ruling:
Yes, the municipal ordinance prohibiting construction of any building that would
destroy the view of plaza from the highway was considered a taking under the power of
eminent domain that could not be allowed without payment of just compensation to the
owner affected. The State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. In effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve
that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as the
Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendantappellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late
Alfonso de Castellvi over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose,
Floridablanca, Pampanga. Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP
refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then
instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic
commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property
when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The
owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lessee.
Ruling:
No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must
enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of
legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not
present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of
lease. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the
"taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint
in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year
1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee
Castellvi. It has been held that mere notice of the intention to expropriate a particular
property does not bind its owner and inhibit him from disposing of it or otherwise dealing
with it. The expropriator can enter the said property only after expropriation proceedings
are actually commenced and the deposit required by law is duly made.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON
CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the
Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance regulating the
establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial
ground within the jurisdiction of quezon city and providing penalties for the violation
thereof" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the
application.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it
refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property."
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private
property.
Ruling:
No. The ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private
property. The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private
property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority,
(4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting
it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the
city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of
a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of
the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and It continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots.