PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic year – precise seminar content
may change from year to year.
Weeks 1-5: Knowledge and Scepticism
Links to many readings are provided here. Some others are available through the library's
electronic resources. Further week by week readings will appear as the module progresses.
Background Reading
DeRose, Keith and Warfield, Ted (eds.). (1999). Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press). Introduction (by DeRose).
Watch The Matrix.
Useful collections (these links are to amazon.co.uk only)
Bernecker, S. and Dretske, F. eds. (2000) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology.
(Oxford: OUP) [Referred to below as B&D.]
Moser, P. K. ed. (2005). The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[Referred to below as OHE]
Sosa, E., Kim, J., Fantl, J., McGrath, M. eds. (2008). Epistemology: An Anthology, (Oxford:
Blackwell). [Referred to below as SKFM]
Steup, M. and Sosa, E. eds. (2013). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. (Oxford: Blackwell).
[Referred to below as S&S]
DeRose, K and Warfield, T. eds. (1999). Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. (New York: Oxford
University Press). [Referred to below as Sk.] The introduction to Sk is especially helpful.
Some useful essays can also be found online in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Referred
to below as SEP]
* = main reading
Week 1
* Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press). Chapter 1.
Putnam, H. Reason, Truth, and History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
[ISBN:9780521297769]. Chapter 1, reprinted in B&D, Sk.
Week 2
* Gettier, E. (1963). ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' Analysis 23:6, pp.121-123.
Dretske, F. (1970). ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy, 67, pp.1007–1023.
Dretske, F. 'Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment: The Case Against Closure', in S&S.
DretskeClosure.
Hawthorne, J. 'The Case for Closure', in S&S. HawthorneClosure.
Vogel, J. ‘Are there counter-examples to the closure principle?’ in M. D. Roth and G. Ross eds
Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990).
Also see the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry for 'The Brain in a Vat Argument'.
Week 3
* Gettier, E. (1963). ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' Analysis 23:6, pp.121-123.
*Dretske, F. 'The Case Against Closure', in S&S. DretskeClosure.
Dretske, F. 1970. ‘Epistemic Operators’, The Journal of Philosophy (67:24), pp.10071023.
J. Vogel ‘Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?’
Lawlor, Krista. 2005. 'Living Without Closure'. Grazer Philosophische Studien. 69:1, pp.25-49.
Nozick, R. Philosophical Explanations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) Chapter 3, section 2.
Relevant selections are reprinted in SKFM and Sk. Nozick
Pritchard, D. Epistemic Luck. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) Chapter 5
Putnam, H. Reason, Truth, and History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Chapter
1, reprinted in B&D, Sk.
Also see the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry for 'The Brain in a Vat Argument'.
Week 4
*Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Chapter 3,
section 2.
*Dancy, J. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell).
Chapter 3.
Week 5
*Brueckner, A. 1991. ‘Unfair to Nozick’, Analysis 51: 61–64.
*Craig, E. 1989. ‘Nozick and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version', Analysis 49: 161-162.
* Dancy, J. 1985. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell).
Chapter 3.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Chapter 3, section 2.
Further reading
Brueckner, A. ‘Brains in a Vat’, in SEP: www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/brain-vat/
Brueckner, A. ‘Unfair to Nozick’, Analysis 51, 1991: 61–64.
Craig, E. 1989. ‘Nozick and the Sceptic: The Thumbnail Version', Analysis 49: 161-162.
Drestke, F. 1981. 'The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies.
Gettier, E. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' Analysis 23: 121-123
Greco, J. ‘External World Skepticism’, Philosophy Compass 2/4, 2007: 625–649.
Klein, P. ‘Skepticism,’ in OHE.
Kvanvig, J. L. ‘Closure Principles’, Philosophy Compass, 1/3, 2006: 256–267.
Luper, S. ‘The Epistemic Closure Principle’, in SEP:
http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/closure-epistemic/
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Chapter 3, section 2.
Pritchard, D. 2005. Epistemic Luck. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Stine, G. 1976. ‘Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives and Deductive Closure’, Philosophical
Studies 29: 249–261.
Wright, C. 1983. ‘Keeping Track of Nozick', Analysis 43: 134-140.
Week 6: reading week (no lectures or seminars)
Week 7: Introducing Persons and Personal Identity
[PLEASE NOTE: each week's reading will continue to be relevant in later weeks.]
* S. Shoemaker. (1959). 'Personal Identity and Memory'. The Journal of Philosophy.
(56:22), pp.868-882.
* S.Shoemaker. (2004). 'Brown-Brownson Revisited'. The Monist. (87:4), pp.573-593.
* B. Williams, 'The Self and the Future' Williams in J. Perry (ed.) Personal
Identity(London: University of California Press).
Personal Identity: Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
Personal Identity: Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy
N. Garver. (1964). 'Criterion of Personal Identity'. Journal of Philosophy. (61:24), pp.779-784.
T.S. Gendler. (2002). 'Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments'. The Philosophical Quarterly.
(52:206), pp.34-54.
E. Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.
D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapters 10-13.
Michael C. Rea and David Silver. (2000). 'Personal Identity and Psychological
Continuity'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (61:1), pp.185-193.
Week 8: John Locke
* J. Locke, 'Of Identity and Diversity' Locke in J. Perry (ed.) Personal Identity (London:
University of California Press).
* J. Locke - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book 2, chapter XXVII).
J. Butler, 'Of Personal Identity' Butler in J. Perry (ed.) Personal Identity (London: University of
California Press).
H. Noonan. (1978). 'Locke on Personal Identity'. Philosophy. (53:205), pp.343-351.
T. Reid, 'Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity' Reid
S. Rieber. (1998). 'The Concept of Personal Identity'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
(58:3), pp.581-594.
Weeks 9 and 10
[Don't forget to continue reading texts from weeks 7 and 8.]
* D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapters 10-13.
D. Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, chapter 6.
P. Snowdon, 'Persons, Animals, and Ourselves', in T. Crane and K. Farkas (eds.) Metaphysics