Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
The Competitive Eect of Multimarket Contact
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Northwestern Transportation Research Center, May 2012
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Hello
Thanks for coming!
What is multi-market contact?
Why should we care?
Prots
Welfare
Regulation
This paper - alternative take on MMC, and specically for the
US Airline industry
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Hello
Thanks for coming!
What is multi-market contact?
Why should we care?
Prots
Welfare
Regulation
This paper - alternative take on MMC, and specically for the
US Airline industry
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Hello
Thanks for coming!
What is multi-market contact?
Why should we care?
Prots
Welfare
Regulation
This paper - alternative take on MMC, and specically for the
US Airline industry
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Hello
Thanks for coming!
What is multi-market contact?
Why should we care?
Prots
Welfare
Regulation
This paper - alternative take on MMC, and specically for the
US Airline industry
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Two Airline Markets
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
MMC in Airline Markets
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Multi Market Contact
American, United and Continental serve most West-bound
markets out of Memphis, but not all
Does the degree of overlap between carriers aect how they
compete?
How would the United-Continental merger aect competition
on the Memphis-Farmington market?
How would the Delta-NW merger aect it? AA-US Airways?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Airlines
Flight scheduling process sets capacities between spokes and
hubs
Also non-hub ights
After the schedule is xed, sell tickets up to capacity (yield
management)
Same AA seat from Memphis to
Dallas can be used for
Memphis to Corpus Christi, Farmington and many other
locations.
Once the ight is full, can't add capacity
If the ight isn't full enough, reduce prices
Most seats in the AA ight from Memphis to
San Antonio
are used for this route.
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Airlines
Flight scheduling process sets capacities between spokes and
hubs
Also non-hub ights
After the schedule is xed, sell tickets up to capacity (yield
management)
Same AA seat from Memphis to
Dallas can be used for
Memphis to Corpus Christi, Farmington and many other
locations.
Once the ight is full, can't add capacity
If the ight isn't full enough, reduce prices
Most seats in the AA ight from Memphis to
San Antonio
are used for this route.
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Airlines
Flight scheduling process sets capacities between spokes and
hubs
Also non-hub ights
After the schedule is xed, sell tickets up to capacity (yield
management)
Same AA seat from Memphis to
Dallas can be used for
Memphis to Corpus Christi, Farmington and many other
locations.
Once the ight is full, can't add capacity
If the ight isn't full enough, reduce prices
Most seats in the AA ight from Memphis to
San Antonio
are used for this route.
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Language
Carriers have dierent degrees of
exibility with respect to a
market
Alternative use for the market's costly resources (seats)
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlap with respect to their
rivals on a market
Which of United's markets are also served by AA?
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlapping exibility
Which of United's exible markets w.r.t. Memphis-Farmington
are also served by AA?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Language
Carriers have dierent degrees of
exibility with respect to a
market
Alternative use for the market's costly resources (seats)
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlap with respect to their
rivals on a market
Which of United's markets are also served by AA?
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlapping exibility
Which of United's exible markets w.r.t. Memphis-Farmington
are also served by AA?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Language
Carriers have dierent degrees of
exibility with respect to a
market
Alternative use for the market's costly resources (seats)
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlap with respect to their
rivals on a market
Which of United's markets are also served by AA?
Carriers have dierent degrees of
overlapping exibility
Which of United's exible markets w.r.t. Memphis-Farmington
are also served by AA?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Multi-Market Contact, Economics and This Paper
Empiric evidence rms that overlap more seem to be less
competitive with each other
Current interpretation overlap facilitates mutual
forbearance
Firms that overlap much are more afraid to be competitive
exibility increases competition, overlapping
exibility cancels the eect
This paper Multi-market rms that overlap much stop taking advantage
of their rival's exibility
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Multi-Market Contact, Economics and This Paper
Empiric evidence rms that overlap more seem to be less
competitive with each other
Current interpretation overlap facilitates mutual
forbearance
Firms that overlap much are more afraid to be competitive
exibility increases competition, overlapping
exibility cancels the eect
This paper Multi-market rms that overlap much stop taking advantage
of their rival's exibility
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Multi-Market Contact, Economics and This Paper
Empiric evidence rms that overlap more seem to be less
competitive with each other
Current interpretation overlap facilitates mutual
forbearance
Firms that overlap much are more afraid to be competitive
exibility increases competition, overlapping
exibility cancels the eect
This paper Multi-market rms that overlap much stop taking advantage
of their rival's exibility
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Mutual Forbearance (has issues)
Continental \ AA
Soft competition
Normal competition
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
Continental and AA prefer soft competition by both over
normal competition by both
But for whatever Continental does, AA maximizes prots by
competing normally
Making an eort to mutually reduce competition would save
each rm 4
Serving many markets increases the stakes - making an eort
to mutually reduce competition in 100 markets would save
each rm 400
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Mutual Forbearance (has issues)
Continental \ AA
Soft competition
Normal competition
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
Continental and AA prefer soft competition by both over
normal competition by both
But for whatever Continental does, AA maximizes prots by
competing normally
Making an eort to mutually reduce competition would save
each rm 4
Serving many markets increases the stakes - making an eort
to mutually reduce competition in 100 markets would save
each rm 400
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Mutual Forbearance (has issues)
Continental \ AA
Soft competition
Normal competition
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
Continental and AA prefer soft competition by both over
normal competition by both
But for whatever Continental does, AA maximizes prots by
competing normally
Making an eort to mutually reduce competition would save
each rm 4
Serving many markets increases the stakes - making an eort
to mutually reduce competition in 100 markets would save
each rm 400
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Why Does Flexibility Increase Competition?
Suppose Continental tries to sell more seats in Memphis-CC
AA will use its exibility to sell less seats in Memphis-CC, and
more seats in Memphis-Farmington and CC-wherever.
If AA wasn't exible, it would have to still sell the seats in
Memphis-CC
Continental doesn't serve those markets, so it doesn't
internalize the eect
Having an accommodating (exible) rival increases competition
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Why Does Flexibility Increase Competition?
Suppose Continental tries to sell more seats in Memphis-CC
AA will use its exibility to sell less seats in Memphis-CC, and
more seats in Memphis-Farmington and CC-wherever.
If AA wasn't exible, it would have to still sell the seats in
Memphis-CC
Continental doesn't serve those markets, so it doesn't
internalize the eect
Having an accommodating (exible) rival increases competition
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Why Does Flexibility Increase Competition?
Suppose Continental tries to sell more seats in Memphis-CC
AA will use its exibility to sell less seats in Memphis-CC, and
more seats in Memphis-Farmington and CC-wherever.
If AA wasn't exible, it would have to still sell the seats in
Memphis-CC
Continental doesn't serve those markets, so it doesn't
internalize the eect
Having an accommodating (exible) rival increases competition
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Why Does Flexibility Increase Competition?
Suppose Continental tries to sell more seats in Memphis-CC
AA will use its exibility to sell less seats in Memphis-CC, and
more seats in Memphis-Farmington and CC-wherever.
If AA wasn't exible, it would have to still sell the seats in
Memphis-CC
Continental doesn't serve those markets, so it doesn't
internalize the eect
Having an accommodating (exible) rival increases competition
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Flexibility
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Continental can go rst - set very high seat capacity in
Houston-CC.
If American will set normal capacity on Houston-CC, it will use
most of its seats in routes from CC that are not served by
Continental
Because AA is
more exible Continental can commit to be a
strong competitor and AA chooses to be a soft competitor
Why can't AA commit?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Flexibility
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Continental can go rst - set very high seat capacity in
Houston-CC.
If American will set normal capacity on Houston-CC, it will use
most of its seats in routes from CC that are not served by
Continental
Because AA is
more exible Continental can commit to be a
strong competitor and AA chooses to be a soft competitor
Why can't AA commit?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Flexibility
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Continental can go rst - set very high seat capacity in
Houston-CC.
If American will set normal capacity on Houston-CC, it will use
most of its seats in routes from CC that are not served by
Continental
Because AA is
more exible Continental can commit to be a
strong competitor and AA chooses to be a soft competitor
Why can't AA commit?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Flexibility
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Continental can go rst - set very high seat capacity in
Houston-CC.
If American will set normal capacity on Houston-CC, it will use
most of its seats in routes from CC that are not served by
Continental
Because AA is
more exible Continental can commit to be a
strong competitor and AA chooses to be a soft competitor
Why can't AA commit?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Intuition - Flexibility
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Continental can go rst - set very high seat capacity in
Houston-CC.
If American will set normal capacity on Houston-CC, it will use
most of its seats in routes from CC that are not served by
Continental
Because AA is
more exible Continental can commit to be a
strong competitor and AA chooses to be a soft competitor
Why can't AA commit?
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Flexibility vs. Mutual Forbearance
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Standard market outcome is normal-normal (Cournot)
Mutual Forbearance - MMC moves outcomes in the direction
of soft-soft (Joint monopoly)
Flexibility - Asymmetric MMC moves outcomes towards
strong-soft (Stackelberg)
As overlap increases, outcomes move closer to the Cournot
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Flexibility vs. Mutual Forbearance
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Standard market outcome is normal-normal (Cournot)
Mutual Forbearance - MMC moves outcomes in the direction
of soft-soft (Joint monopoly)
Flexibility - Asymmetric MMC moves outcomes towards
strong-soft (Stackelberg)
As overlap increases, outcomes move closer to the Cournot
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Flexibility vs. Mutual Forbearance
Continental \ AA
Soft comp.
Normal comp.
Strong comp.
Soft competition
10, 10
5, 14
4, 8
Normal competition
14, 5
6, 6
2, 5
Strong competition
8, 3
5, 2
0, 0
Standard market outcome is normal-normal (Cournot)
Mutual Forbearance - MMC moves outcomes in the direction
of soft-soft (Joint monopoly)
Flexibility - Asymmetric MMC moves outcomes towards
strong-soft (Stackelberg)
As overlap increases, outcomes move closer to the Cournot
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Setup
What is the eect of changes in the sizes of the ellipse, square and
triangle
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Model
Two rms (A and B), three markets (o, A and B).
Each rm serves its own market. Both rms serve the 'o'
(overlapping) market.
Inverse demand
P (Q ; m) where Q
is market quantity and
m
is
a market parameter
Two stages:
1
2
Each rm (j ) chooses its aggregate capacity: kA , kB , pays c · kj
Each rm chooses the quantity it supplies to each market that
is serves
Quantities in the overlapping market: qA , qB
Quantities in the private markets: q̂A , q̂B
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Model - Details
For the most part, linear demand
P (Q ; m ) = a −
b
·Q
m
Think of mj as the number of equally sized markets
Second stage quantities limited by rst stage capacity:
qj + q̂j ≤ kj
If MMC had no eect, MR = c and
qA = qB = mo
a−c
q̂j = mj
2b
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
a−c
3b
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Questions
Firm aggressiveness. Characterize
c − MRj
Degree of overlap for symmetric rms
Fix mA = mB and mA + mB + mo . What are the eects of
increasing mo
Private markets for asymmetric rms
Comparative statics with respect to mA
Welfare maximizing distribution of the private markets
Fix mo and mA + mB , what is the surplus maximizing mA
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Questions
Firm aggressiveness. Characterize
c − MRj
Degree of overlap for symmetric rms
Fix mA = mB and mA + mB + mo . What are the eects of
increasing mo
Private markets for asymmetric rms
Comparative statics with respect to mA
Welfare maximizing distribution of the private markets
Fix mo and mA + mB , what is the surplus maximizing mA
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Questions
Firm aggressiveness. Characterize
c − MRj
Degree of overlap for symmetric rms
Fix mA = mB and mA + mB + mo . What are the eects of
increasing mo
Private markets for asymmetric rms
Comparative statics with respect to mA
Welfare maximizing distribution of the private markets
Fix mo and mA + mB , what is the surplus maximizing mA
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Questions
Firm aggressiveness. Characterize
c − MRj
Degree of overlap for symmetric rms
Fix mA = mB and mA + mB + mo . What are the eects of
increasing mo
Private markets for asymmetric rms
Comparative statics with respect to mA
Welfare maximizing distribution of the private markets
Fix mo and mA + mB , what is the surplus maximizing mA
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Two Economic Forces
Flexibility - ability to react in the second stage to rival's
strategy
∂ qj
φj ≡
≤0
∂ q−j
linear
1
demand:φ ∈ − , 0
2
Commitment power - ability to allocate rst stage deviation to
the overlapping market
σj ≡
∂ qj
≥0
∂ kj
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
linear demand:σ
∈ [0, 1]
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Two Economic Forces
Flexibility - ability to react in the second stage to rival's
strategy
∂ qj
φj ≡
≤0
∂ q−j
linear
1
demand:φ ∈ − , 0
2
Commitment power - ability to allocate rst stage deviation to
the overlapping market
σj ≡
∂ qj
≥0
∂ kj
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
linear demand:σ
∈ [0, 1]
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Symmetric Firms
Theorem
Suppose m0 = λ M and mA = mB = M · 1−λ
2 . Then:
qj q̂j kj 3 3 + 10λ + 3λ 2
=
=
=
qj∗ q̂j∗ kj∗ 9 + 26 · λ + 13λ 2
∂ qj /qj∗
∂λ
;
√
R 0 ⇐⇒ λ Q
4
3−3
13
.
Where q ∗ and k ∗ are the standard Cournot quantities
Corollary
Eect of overlap is non-monotonic
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Application - Symmetric Firm Growth / Mergers
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
The Overlapping Market with Asymmetric Firms
Firm Share Increases in Rival's Private Market Size
Firms' Quantity in the Overlapping Market
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Empirical Prediction
If a carrier j has no exible markets with respect to ha, bi, its
market share in ha, bi increases with the size of its rival's
exible and non-overlapping markets w.r.t. ha, bi.
sj ,r ,t = β ln [µj ,r ,t ] + γ Xj ,r ,t
Limit attention to cases in which
µj ,r ,t
is a measure of
mA .
mB = 0
Use seats sold by j 's rival in route r for all the exible and
non-overlapping markets the rival has with respect to market r
and carrier j
Same results with market counts and revenues
Use US Domestic airline data (BTS DB1B) 1993 to 2010.
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Results
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Results - Detail
Coecient on
µjrt
is positive and signicant
A one percent increase in rival's exible, private, markets
corresponds to a ~0.75 percentage point increase in the
carrier's share, or about 1.5 percent change in revenue.
Eect of rival's
connected routes is negative and signicant
Eect of market share in endpoints is positive and signicant
Similar results when counting markets or revenue instead of
seats
More empirical work in a follow up paper
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Discussion
Concerns about Mutli-Market Contact implications aect
merger evaluation and regulatory involvement in markets
Evidence for anti-competitive behavior is important
Important to know if can actually be misinterpreting
competitive behavior
This paper - dierences in multi-market coverage (large private
markets) increase competition
Harder to evaluate merger implications
Could be that Delta-NW and United-Continental are ne, but
AA and US Airways would be bad
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
That's It !
Thank you
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition
Introduction
Multi Market Contact
Formal Model
Empirics
Suggestive Evidence
Data - Summary Statistics
Market Share
Rival's Flexible & Non-Overlap (ln['000])
Price ($)
Cost ($)
Endpoint Market Shares
Rival's Connected (ln['000])
# of Non-Stop Carriers*
# of Carriers*
Herndahl Index*
Daily Passengers on Route*
Mean
SD
Min
Max
0.49
-3.19
160
53
0.32
6.22
1.62
4.26
0.58
453
0.31
3.91
77
77
0.22
0.99
0.91
1.86
0.21
752
0.01
-6.91
0
0
0.00
-2.80
0
2
0
5
0.99
5.73
4113
12349
0.97
8.59
8
11
1
11,985
Unit of observation is a route-carrier-year-quarter. Sample includes only obs with no exible routes and
with at least one rival on the route: 125,831 obs. (*) Unit of observation is a r-y-q; 78,454
observations.
Guy Arie, Sarit Markovich, Mauricio Varela
Multi-Market Competition